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In the last decade, dozens of local governments have enacted zoning
ordinances designed to limit the concentration of payday lenders and other
alternative financial services providers (AFSPs), such as check-cashing
businesses and auto title loan shops, in their communities. The main impetus
for these ordinances is to shield economically vulnerable residents from the
industry's lending practices in the absence of sufficiently aggressive federal
and state consumer protection regulation.
This Article casts considerable doubt on whether zoning is the appropriate
regulatory tool to achieve the consumer protection and welfare goals
animating these ordinances. The author's analysis of the aftermath of payday-
lending zoning restrictions in one state demonstrates that while such laws may
play a role in reducing the number of payday lenders in the immediate urban
area, they do not shield consumers from these lenders altogether. Further, the
economic literature on agglomeration economies suggests that there are costs
to consumer welfare from limiting or breaking up retail agglomerations. Such
"anti-agglomeration" zoning restrictions can prevent consumers from
capturing the benefits of the price and product competition that result from
retail agglomerations.
This Article concludes that if the main impetus behind anti-agglomeration
zoning measures is to protect local residents from the high interest rates and
loan terms associated with the payday-lending industry, it might be that these
measures are working against their intended purpose and actually harming
consumers who lack viable financial services alternatives. As such, in
weighing the costs and benefits of payday-lender agglomeration, lawmakers
should consider more carefully the effects of anti-agglomeration zoning
measures on consumer welfare.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the last decade, dozens of local governments have enacted zoning
ordinances designed to limit the concentration of payday lenders and similar
"alternative financial services providers" (AFSPs), such as check-cashing
businesses and auto title loan shops, in their communities.1 Advocates of these
local laws contend that payday lending and similar businesses have been
proliferating at a rate that is troubling.2 In some communities, these businesses
are more ubiquitous than Starbucks coffee shops and McDonald's restaurants. 3
The ubiquity of payday lenders in certain communities is due, some argue, to a
"spatial void" left by more traditional lenders that have decamped from many
middle-class and low-income communities in significant numbers. 4 Largely
because of their high fees and controversial loan-rollover practices, payday
loans are said to trap consumers in a cycle of debt and dependency from which
it is difficult to emerge.5
I See infra Part II.C.3.
2 Several states prohibit outright the operation of payday-lending establishments, while
others impose usury limits on consumer loans, which effectively prohibit payday lending in
the state. Thirty-eight states, however, specifically authorize payday lenders to operate
within certain defined limits. It is in many of these states where local governments have been
the most active in regulating payday lenders through land-use laws. See infra Part I.C.2.
3 See, e.g., Leah A. Plunkett & Ana Lucia Hurtado, Small-Dollar Loans, Big
Problems: How States Protect Consumers from Abuses and How the Federal Government
Can Help, 44 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 31, 31 (2011).
4 See discussion infra Part II.B.
5See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, PAYDAY LOANS AND DEPOSIT ADVANCE
PRODUCTS: A WHITE PAPER OF INITIAL DATA FINDINGS 4 (2013) [hereinafter CFPB WHITE
PAPER], available at http://files.consumerfinance.gov/fl201304_cfpb payday-dap-white
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Although the empirical evidence on the consumer-welfare impacts of
payday lending is mixed, 6 many local governments are convinced that payday
lenders do more harm than good in their communities. As such, recently passed
zoning ordinances are designed to break up existing payday-lender
agglomeration and to curb the concentration of new payday lenders.7 They do
so by prohibiting the location of any new payday-lending business within close
distance of another payday lender and often within close distance of residential
zones, schools, parks, or major throughways.8 This Article introduces the
concept of "anti-agglomeration" zoning to highlight and explore the benefits
and costs of zoning restrictions designed to de-concentrate payday lenders as a
putative means of protecting consumers from this industry.
Local governments have broad authority to regulate the location and
operation of payday lenders within their borders. The Supreme Court's opinion
in Village ofEuclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co. established the general principle
that zoning restrictions can legitimately be designed to protect the public safety,
health, and welfare of residents.9 This "public welfare" justification is broad
enough to impose few limits on a local government's zoning authority,
paper.pdf ("A primary focus is on what we term 'sustained use'-the long-term use of a
short-term high-cost product evidenced by a pattern of repeatedly rolling over or consistently
re-borrowing, resulting in the consumer incurring a high level of accumulated fees.").
Payday lenders contend, however, that high fees and interest rates are justified by the high
risks associated with the borrowers to whom they cater. These borrowers have lower
incomes, fewer assets, often bad or no credit histories, and may change residences quite
frequently. As such, loan losses and fixed operating costs may justify the rates charged by
payday lenders. See generally Aaron Huckstep, Payday Lending: Do Outrageous Prices
Necessarily Mean Outrageous Profits?, 12 FORDHAM J. CoRP. & FIN. L. 203 (2007); Mark
Flannery & Katherine Samolyk, Payday Lending: Do the Costs Justify the Price? (FDIC Ctr.
for Fin. Research, Working Paper No. 2005-09, 2005), available at http://www.fdic.gov/
bank/analytical/cfr/2005/wp2005/CFRWP_2005-09_FlannerySamolyk.pdf; Paige Skiba &
Jeremy Tobacman, The Profitability of Payday Loans (Dec. 10, 2007) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://www.cpla-acps.ca/english/reports/Vanderbilt%200xford%
20profitability/o20study/2012%2010%202007.pdf. This debate is beyond the scope of the
Article. The point that this Article will engage is whether usury and other consumer
protection laws are the more appropriate regulatory mechanism than are land-use laws for
controlling the relationship between lender risk and consumer protection.
6 See infra Part II.A.
7 See generally Christopher L. Peterson, "Warning: Predatory Lender"-A Proposal
for Candid Predatory Small Loan Ordinances, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 893 (2012).
These laws are aimed both at preventing the concentration, or agglomeration, of
payday lenders in commercial zones, and at limiting their agglomeration within the
municipality itself. See infra Part III.A. For those payday businesses that already exist within
these localities, these laws prevent them from expanding at their current location and restrict
how they operate their businesses. See infra Part III.A. Other laws prevent, or make it very
difficult, for new payday lenders to locate in areas where previous payday lenders were
located. See infra Part III.A.
9 Vill. of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926) (requiring a
"substantial relation[ship]" between the zoning mechanism and the public health, safety,
morals, or general welfare of the citizenry the local government is trying to protect).
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particularly the authority to exclude, separate, or limit particular types of land
uses deemed harmful in some way to the local community.' 0 As land-use
scholars have pointed out, local governments have long limited the siting and
concentration of "controversial" retail commercial establishments-including
tattoo shops, marijuana-dispensing facilities, pawn shops, and adult
businesses-to protect their residents and community character from the
negative spillovers associated with these land uses.11 Although the primary
impetus motivating many of these ordinances is to shield economically
vulnerable residents from payday lenders,12 there is little doubt these ordinances
fall within the broad "public welfare" rationale of Euclid.
The legality of payday zoning regulations, however, raises the underlying
question of the relationship between land-use controls and consumer protection,
10See, e.g., Vill. of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974) (declaring that zoning
power could be used to create a "quiet place where yards are wide, people few, and motor
vehicles restricted . . .. to lay out zones where family values, youth values, and the blessings
of quiet seclusion and clean air make the area a sanctuary for people"); Berman v. Parker,
348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954) (holding that values that represent public welfare include the
"spiritual as well as [the] physical, aesthetic as well as monetary").
I" See, e.g., Patricia Salkin, Regulating Controversial Land Uses, 39 REAL EST. L.J.
526, 526 (2011) (noting that "controversial" land uses are often subject to strict zoning
constraints because they are aesthetically undesirable, generate undesirable traffic or noise,
threaten to decrease surrounding property values, or are bad for existing businesses because
they drive away patrons from commercial areas).
12 Concerns about secondary negative effects of payday-lender concentration are also
often cited as a reason for these zoning ordinances. See infra Part V.B. However, it is clear
from the legislative findings, public debates, and local media coverage that many of these
zoning ordinances are primarily motivated by a concern for the financial security of local
residents and a desire to protect economically vulnerable populations from payday lenders.
See, e.g., Holly Heinrich, Texas Cities Take Action To Regulate Payday Lenders, TEX. TRIB.
(May 3, 2012), http://www.texastribune.org/2012/05/03/faced-city-ordinances-payday-lob
bies-reappear/ (noting that these ordinances come on the heels of state consumer protection
laws which some city councils felt were not comprehensive enough); OVERLAND PARK,
KAN., MUNICIPAL CODE tit. 5, ch. 5.72, § 5.72.010 (2007), available at http://www.opkansas.
org/wp-content/uploads/downloads/572-Payday-and-Title-Loan-Businesses.pdf (legislative
findings indicate that "[t]hese businesses should be regulated . .. because certain payday and
title loan lending practices have proven detrimental to the financial security of individuals
and families residing in the City," and their lending practices "often have an unreasonably
adverse effect upon the elderly, the economically disadvantaged and other residents of the
City"); GLADSTONE, MO., ORDINANCE No. 4.036 (2007), available at http://www.gladstone.
mo.us/documents/ordinances/paydayloan zoning/PaydayloanZoningOrdinance.pdf
(purpose of ordinance is to reduce the clustering of payday lenders in part because they have
been found to "adversely [a]ffect some segments of society, such as the elderly, and military
personnel, and are viewed as creating burdensome financial strain on the lower and lower-
middle class populations within local communities"); PUBLIC HEARING: Consideration of
a Proposed Ordinance Amending Title 5 of the Logan Municipal Code Placing Density
Limitations on Non-depository Financial Institutions Adding Sections 5.19.010 and
5.19.020-09-39 (Utah 2009), available at http://www.loganutah.org/City/o20Council/Min
utes/2009/Mayl9.pdf (councilmember statement that it is the government's task to protect
"the disadvantaged" and "the impoverished" from payday-lending companies).
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or welfare.' 3 This Article explores that relationship and questions whether the
regulation of payday lenders through zoning restrictions is the best way to
achieve the consumer-welfare goals animating these laws. Land-use scholars
have long posited a relationship between zoning and consumer welfare by
recognizing the ways that zoning protects homeowners from declining home
values.14 Zoning that separates or excludes less desirable land uses (and less
desirable residents)15 from residential neighborhoods also protects a
homeowner's consumer surplus-i.e., the value placed on the home that lies
above and beyond its market value.16
The flip side of exclusionary zoning, however, is concentration. Classic
Euclidean zoning not only separates and excludes incompatible land uses from
residential areas, but also forces together compatible land uses into their own
13 Although the Article uses the terms "consumer welfare" and "consumer protection"
sometimes interchangeably, it acknowledges that the terms speak to distinct sets of concerns.
Consumer welfare refers to the benefits derived from the consumption of a good or service,
as compared to the costs of that consumption. Consumer welfare might be measured by
individual preferences for a good or service or the overall net benefits of consumption of that
good or service. See, e.g., Glossary of Statistical Terms, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION &
DEv. (OECD), http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=3177 (last updated Mar. 15,
2002). Consumer protection, on the other hand, typically refers to the methods employed to
ensure the rights of consumers by guaranteeing that producers and suppliers efficiently
respond to meet consumers' stable preferences. See, e.g., COLIN ScoTT & JULIA BLACK,
CRANSTON'S CONSUMERS AND THE LAW 1 (William Twining & Christopher McCrudden
eds., 3d ed. 2000).
14 As William Fischel argues in his work, zoning restrictions became increasingly
ubiquitous and exclusionary over time because homeowners had no effective means of
insuring assets against the threat of nonconforming uses and against value-reducing
development brought on by improved transportation means. William A. Fischel, An
Economic History of Zoning and a Cure for Its Exclusionary Effects, 41 URB. STUD. 317,
321-23 (2004); see also Daniel P. McMillen & John F. McDonald, Land Values in a Newly
Zoned City, 84 REV. ECON. & STAT. 62, 62 (2002) (finding, after controlling for initial land
use and the endogeneity of zoning decisions, that residential zoning led to higher land value
growth rates than commercial zoning).
15 Zoning that excludes those unable to pay the level of local property taxes that
support the kind of public goods that the community prefers is referred to as "fiscal zoning."
See, e.g., Edwin S. Mills & Wallace E. Oates, The Theory of Local Public Services and
Finance: Its Relevance to Urban Fiscal and Zoning Behavior, in FISCAL ZONING AND LAND
USE CONTROLS: THE ECONOMIC ISSUES 1, 6-11 (Edwin S. Mills & Wallace E. Oates eds.,
1975).
16 As Bradley Karkkainen has argued, this consumer surplus is protected through the
exclusion from the neighborhood "commons" of land uses inconsistent with its "character."
Bradley C. Karkkainen, Zoning: A Reply to the Critics, 10 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 45, 68
(1994). To the extent that the "character" of the neighborhood is capitalized in the market
value of individual parcels, protecting the collective resources of the community is another
way that Euclidean zoning adds to and protects home values. Id. at 68-70. Thus, a purchaser
of residential property in an urban neighborhood buys not only a particular parcel of real
estate, but also a share in the "neighborhood commons." Id. ("Typically, differences in the
neighborhood commons may be as crucial to a decision to purchase as differences in
individual parcels.").
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zones-e.g., commercial and industrial zones. 17 This is why payday lenders and
other AFSPs are typically located in retail-zone clusters, usually strip malls or
heavily traveled commercial thoroughfares, as either stand-alone storefronts or
co-operating with another retail business.' 8 Moreover, just as exclusion can
generate both positive and negative "spillovers" well beyond the boundaries of
a particular piece of property,19 so too can concentration generate negative and
positive spillovers. While land-use law and scholarship are accustomed to the
"negative externalities" that result from the concentration of certain industrial or
commercial land uses,20 the positive benefits of such concentration have been
largely ignored.21
17 Commercial zones, for example, force various kinds of shops, restaurants,
entertainment facilities, and office buildings to locate together.
18 See Advance America Cash Centers, PAYDAY LOAN FACTS, http://www.paydayloan
facts.com/the-brands-of-payday/advance-america-cash-centers/ (last visited Jan. 7, 2014)
(describing the business practices of the largest store-based payday-loan chain); see also
KELLY GRIFFITH ET AL., CONTROLLING THE GROWTH OF PAYDAY LENDING THROUGH LOCAL
ORDINANCES AND RESOLUTIONS 3-8 (2007), available at http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/
Resources.PDL.LocalOrdinanceManual 1.13.12.pdf.
1 9 See LEE ANNE FENNELL, THE UNBOUNDED HOME: PROPERTY VALUES BEYOND
PROPERTY LINES 2-4 (2009). One of the main critiques of Euclidean zoning is that its
exclusionary tendencies fall too easily into the trap of excluding classes of people, such as
the poor, and not just classes of land uses from suburban communities:
Once exclusion for the benefit of a favored class of property owners was sanctioned as
the raison d'etre of zoning, the benefits of municipal incorporation became
irresistible.... Virtually every state in the nation has conferred upon its citizens the
right to incorporate a new municipality; to be immune from annexation by the central
city; to engage in exclusionary zoning that creates expensive havens of single-family
homes devoid of any modest housing; to legislate, tax local property, and provide
services solely in the interests of their local residents; in short, to be utterly self-
interested in defining borders and policies that usually result in race and class divisions.
SHERYLL CASHIN, THE FAILURES OF INTEGRATION: How RACE AND CLASS ARE
UNDERMINING THE AMERICAN DREAM 108 (2004).2 0 Indeed, an anti-nuisance rationale is built into the framework of Euclidean zoning. In
his opinion in Euclid, Justice Sutherland explicitly referred to the law of nuisance to justify
the scope of power that localities have to segregate particular types of land uses that are
"offensive and dangerous." Vill. of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387-
89 (1926); see also Case Comment, Zoning and the Law ofNuisance, 29 FORDHAM L. REv.
749, 750-51 (1961). Industrial land uses, for instance, are set apart from residential uses to
avoid harm to nearby property and persons. See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to
Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REv.
681, 693 (1973) ("Where a noxious use is permitted, planning officials generally try to place
it adjacent to activities not particularly vulnerable to the type of harm caused by that use. For
example, most zoning ordinances cluster industrial uses, often placing the cluster adjacent to
railroad tracks.").
21 A notable exception is a recent article by Gideon Parchomovsky and Peter
Siegelman, discussed infra in Part IV.C. See Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman,
Cities, Property, and Positive Externalities, 54 WM. & MARY L. REv. 211, 246-60 (2012).
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As economists have written in extensive literature on agglomeration
economies, the spatial concentration of certain industries can give rise to
economies of scale, which result in supply- and demand-side "positive
agglomeration externalities." 22 These benefits can be captured on the supply
side by retail firms that concentrate in commercial zone clusters and on the
demand side by both firms and retail consumers engaged in comparison
shopping. Zoning restrictions that force firms to locate close to their rivals-i.e.,
to agglomerate-can generate demand-side benefits for consumers by reducing
their search costs and incentivizing firms to compete on price and greater
product and format variety. 23
This Article extends the link between zoning and retail firm proximity one
step further to argue that zoning restrictions, which limit or prevent firm
agglomeration, can increase search costs and reduce the incentives for
competition between retail firms. As such, zoning limitations on retail firm
proximity can frustrate the internalization of positive externalities not just by
firms, as legal scholars have argued,24 but also by retail consumers. This Article
posits that zoning, which restricts firm location and density, risks depriving
consumers of the agglomeration benefits that competition between proximate
firms can provide.
If the primary impetus behind anti-agglomeration zoning measures is to
protect local residents from the lending practices associated with the payday-
lending industry, and therefore to improve consumer welfare, it might be that
these measures are working against their intended purpose. This is particularly
so if the competition that results from firm agglomeration would benefit
consumers in the absence of more stringent federal or state financial regulation.
That is, if market competition has the potential to discipline lenders through
agglomeration economies, then anti-agglomerative measures might be harming
consumers who lack viable financial services alternatives. This is not to say that
zoning controls cannot play a role in striking the right balance between reducing
or limiting the negative externalities that might be associated with some kinds
of retail agglomerations and the positive benefits that such agglomerations
generate, especially for consumers.25 Rather, the anti-agglomeration zoning
ordinances at issue in this Article seem to be concerned with the former but
completely ignore the latter.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part II examines the link between payday
lending and consumer welfare and argues that land-use ordinances aimed at
regulating the payday industry are an attempt, in part, to fill a spatial and
regulatory void that has resulted in the proliferation of payday lenders in certain
22 See infra Part W.A.
23 See infra Part IV.B.
24 Daniel B. Rodriguez & David Schleicher, The Location Market, 19 GEO. MASON L.
REv. 637, 646 (2012) (arguing that zoning limitations on commercial development are a
supply-side restriction, making it difficult for firms to capture the positive spillovers from
close proximity).25 See infra Parts IV-V.
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communities. Part III begins to explore the anti-agglomerative character of
recently enacted payday-lender zoning restrictions through an analysis of data
on the location of payday lenders in California localities before and after the
passage of payday zoning ordinances. Based on this brief study, this Part
concludes that anti-agglomeration zoning laws are unlikely to protect or shield
consumers from payday lenders even if they are successful in reducing the
concentration of such lenders in a given municipality.
Part IV then considers whether breaking up payday agglomerations has
implications for consumer welfare. This Part considers the literature on retail
agglomerations, zoning, and competition. There is evidence that, by
concentrating retail firms closely together, restrictive zoning controls can
increase the degree of competition between firms and that this competition has
direct and positive payoffs for consumers in the form of increased product and
service variety and decreased prices for similar products and services. Based on
this literature, Part V argues that zoning restrictions that make it difficult for
payday lenders and other AFSPs to form retail agglomerations are likely to have
a negative effect on consumer welfare. The potential cost to consumer welfare
of breaking up payday agglomerations thus should be weighed against whatever
benefits there are to avoiding potentially negative spillovers from those
agglomerations.
II. CONTROLLING PAYDAY
Local land-use regulation of the payday-lending industry occurs against the
backdrop of a spatial and regulatory void that has allowed these businesses to
proliferate in certain communities. The empirical evidence suggests that the
spatial concentration of payday lenders is, at least in part, the result of the lack
of a robust presence of more traditional lenders in some communities, in
addition to the barriers to traditional lending faced by many in these
communities. Moreover, the lack of a stronger federal and state role in
regulating the payday-lending industry has created what might be characterized
as a regulatory gap, into which local governments have stepped.
A. The Benefits and Costs of Payday Lending
Payday loans are short-term cash given to borrowers in exchange for a
personal check (or, in some instances, borrowers sign over electronic access to
their checking accounts), which is held by the lender until a date in the future,
usually the borrower's next payday.26 The lenders charge a percentage fee up
front (e.g., twelve percent) on the amount borrowed. Some fees can add up to an
2 6 Consumer Information-Payday Loans, FED. TRADE COMMIsSION (Mar. 2008),
http://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0097-payday-loans. Payday-loan customers are
required to have a bank account and a job or other source of income. See id.
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annual percentage rate (APR) of interest in excess of 400 percent.27 Many
borrowers will also renew the loans several times before they are able to pay the
principal in full. Several studies suggest that the survival of the payday-lending
industry depends on a business model of "chronic borrowing." 28
Yet, it is also the case that access to quick cash, even at high interest rates,
can prevent the economically vulnerable from falling further behind.29 Studies
show that most payday-loan borrowers have incomes between $15,000 and
$50,000.30 Payday-loan consumers generally suffer from liquidity and credit
constraints and turn to these products when they encounter a financial
emergency and perceive their alternatives to be limited.31 For both local
policymakers and researchers, one of the fundamental questions is whether the
fees and short-term repayment terms for payday loans help borrowers who are
experiencing financial hardship or lead them into even worse long-term
27 See, e.g., Kelly D. Edmiston, Could Restrictions on Payday Lending Hurt
Consumers?, FED. RES. BANK KAN. CITY ECON. REV., First Qtr. 2011, at 63, 63-65,
available at http://kc.frb.org/publicat/econrev/pdf/llqlEdmiston.pdf (explaining that while
payday lenders often charge fees rather than interest payments, in effect these charges are
interest and require computing an effective annual interest rate; author gives as an example a
typical payday loan charge of $15 per $100 borrowed, thus if the term of the loan is two
weeks, then the effective annual interest rate is 390 percent); Robert DeYoung & Ronnie J.
Phillips, Payday Loan Pricing I (The Fed. Reserve Bank of Kan. City Econ. Research
Dep't, Research Working Paper No. 09-07, 2009) (giving as an example a typical $300 two-
week loan which might carry a $50 finance charge; this amounts to a 435% APR of interest).
28 A number of state government studies found that consumers typically rolled over
their loans ten to twelve times each year. Kelly J. Noyes, Comment, Get Cash Until Payday!
The Payday-Loan Problem in Wisconsin, 2006 Wis. L. REV. 1627, 1637; see also KEITH
ERNST ET AL., CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, QUANTIFYING THE ECONOMIC COST OF
PREDATORY PAYDAY LENDING 3-5 (2003) (revised Feb. 2004), available at http://www.re
sponsiblelending.org/payday-lending/research-analysis/CRLpaydaylendingstudyl 21803.pdf
("[B]orrowers who receive five or more payday loans per year account for 91% of payday
lenders' revenues."); Ronald J. Mann & Jim Hawkins, Just Until Payday, 54 UCLA L. REv.
855, 864 (2007). Not all scholars believe that there is an empirically-supported link between
fringe banking, including payday lending, and consumer financial distress. See, e.g., Jim
Hawkins, Regulating on the Fringe: Reexamining the Link Between Fringe Banking and
Financial Distress, 86 ND. L.J. 1361, 1399-1402 (2011) (noting that credit in the fringe
economy is specifically structured to prevent borrowers from experiencing financial distress;
because repayment is guaranteed by the structure of the transaction, it is difficult for
borrowers to take on unmanageable debt loads).
2 9 See, e.g., THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, REPORT No. 3, PAYDAY LENDING IN
AMERICA: POLICY SOLUTIONS, front matter (2013) [hereinafter PEW POLICY SOLUTIONS],
available at http://www.pewstates.org/uploadedFiles/PCSAssets/2013/PewPaydayPolicy
_SolutionsOct 2013.pdf ("Most often, they use the loans to pay rent, utility bills, and other
routine obligations .... .").
30 E.g., Richard Hynes, Payday Lending, Bankruptcy, and Insolvency, 69 WASH. & LEE
L. REv. 607, 632 (2012); Brian T. Melzer, The Real Costs of Credit Access: Evidence from
the Payday Lending Market, 126 Q.J. ECONOMICS 517, 523 (2011).
3 1 See, e.g., Sumit Agarwal et al., Payday Loans and Credit Cards: New Liquidity and
Credit Scoring Puzzles? 3-4 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14659,
2009), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/wl4659.pdfnewwindow=1.
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financial difficulties. The literature on this question is relatively extensive, but
inconclusive, suggesting that while payday lending may prevent many low- and
moderate-income individuals from falling further behind, there may be risks for
other individuals who use these products.
One measure of whether payday lending harms consumers is to compare
bankruptcy rates of consumers with payday loans and those without such loans.
Some studies find that payday loans are associated with higher personal
bankruptcy rates,32 while others have concluded that there is no tangible link
between payday loans and bankruptcy filings. 33 Still other researchers have
attempted to measure payday loans' consumer and welfare effects by comparing
the financial status and difficulties of individuals who have access to payday
loans to those who do not have access to such credit. As with other research in
this area, the studies using this comparison are inconclusive. Some researchers
have found that payday loans have "limited average effects (positive or
negative) on financial well-being," 34 while other studies have found that payday
32 See generally Robert Mayer, Payday Lending and Personal Bankruptcy, 50
CONSUMER INTERESTS ANN. 76 (2004) (examining bankruptcy petitions in the most populous
counties in Illinois, New Mexico, and Wisconsin and finding that payday-loan debtors
declare bankruptcy more quickly than non-payday-loan borrowers); see also Donald P.
Morgan et al., How Payday Credit Access Affects Overdrafts and Other Outcomes, 44 J.
MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 519, 524-26 (2012) (examining Chapter 13 bankruptcy filings
per 10,000 persons at the state level between 1998 and 2008 and finding that bankruptcy
rates had decreased after payday-loan bans were enacted, but also finding that complaints
against lenders and debt collectors had increased); Paige Marta Skiba & Jeremy Tobacman,
Do Payday Loans Cause Bankruptcy? I (Vanderbilt Univ. Law Sch. Law & Econ., Working
Paper No. 11-13, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cftm?abstractid=126
6215 (examining administrative data from one large payday-loan provider and finding
higher bankruptcy rates among individuals who took out payday loans).
33 See ROBERT SHAPIRO, SONECON, THE CONSUMER AND SOCIAL WELFARE BENEFITS
AND COSTS OF PAYDAY LOANS: A REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE 12 (2011), available at
http://www.sonecon.com/docs/studies/Report-Payday-Loans-Shapiro-Sonecon.pdf (citing a
recent study that examined the bankruptcy rates before and after eight states had banned
payday loans, and before and after eleven other states had enacted legislation permitting
payday loans, and finding higher bankruptcy rates in the eight states that had banned short-
term lending, after those bans took effect); Lars Lefgren & Frank McIntyre, Explaining the
Puzzle of Cross-state Differences in Bankruptcy Rates, 52 J.L. & ECON. 367, 391 (2009)
(finding that the existence of payday loans does not affect bankruptcy rates, and that high
levels of bankruptcy are predicated on family structure, race, and education); Petru S.
Stoianovici & Michael T. Maloney, Restrictions on Credit: A Public Policy Analysis of
Payday Lending 2 (Oct. 28, 2008) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Clemson University),
available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers/cfm?abstract-id=1291278 (examining state-
level data between 1990 and 2006, and controlling for state restrictions on payday lenders,
finding no empirical evidence that payday lending leads to more personal bankruptcy
filings).
34 See, e.g., Neil Bhutta et al., Payday Loan Choices and Consequences 27 (Vanderbilt
Univ. Law Sch. Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 12-30, 2012), available at http://papers.
ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfn?abstractid=2160947 (noting that their conclusion might be true
66 [Vol. 75: 1
BREAKING UP PAYDAY
credit helps consumers' overall credit standing.35 Still, there is evidence that
payday loans carry financial risks for consumers, particularly low-income
households. 36
In all, despite the comprehensive research in this area and the relative
abundance of literature on the consumer and social costs of payday loans, the
debate on this issue remains unresolved. This is due, at least in part, to the fact
that many of the relevant studies arguably suffer from methodological
shortcomings. As Robert Shapiro explains, most studies in the area rely on
"indirect analytic approaches," which do not measure the "marginal cost of
credit to consumers when payday loans are restricted, with controls over other
variables." 37 Notwithstanding the limitations and inconclusiveness of the
because payday loans are "small and uncollateralized, limiting their potential benefits and
risks").
3 5 See, e.g., DONALD P. MORGAN, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., STAFF REPORT No.
273, DEFINING AND DETECTING PREDATORY LENDING 2-3 (2007), available at
http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff reports/sr273.pdf (comparing debt and
delinquency rates over a one-year period in households in states with varying levels of
access to payday loans and finding that households with unlimited access to payday loans
were less likely to have missed a debt payment); Edmiston, supra note 27, at 64 (examining
county-level consumer credit data and concluding that restrictions on payday lending not
only deny consumers access to credit, but also "limit their ability to maintain formal credit
standing, or force them to seek more costly credit alternatives"); Jonathan Zinman,
Restricting Consumer Credit Access: Household Survey Evidence on Effects Around the
Oregon Rate Cap, 34 J. BANKING & FIN. 547, 549 (2010) (Oregon's payday "cap"
effectively decreased short-term borrowing in the state but also reduced the supply of credit
available for residents, compelling former payday borrowers to seek "incomplete and
plausibly inferior substitutes," such as checking account overdrafts, late bills, or both); see
also DONALD P. MORGAN & MICHAEL R. STRAIN, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., STAFF
REPORT No. 309, PAYDAY HOLIDAY: How HOUSEHOLDS FARE AFTER PAYDAY CREDIT BANS
(2007) (revised Feb. 2008), available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff reports/
sr309.pdf (finding that compared with households in states where payday lending is
permitted, households in Georgia have bounced more checks, complained more to the
Federal Trade Commission about lenders and debt collectors, and filed for Chapter 7
bankruptcy protection at a higher rate; also finding that North Carolina households have
fared about the same).
36 See Melzer, supra note 30, at 550 (loan access makes it more difficult for low-
income households to pay mortgage, rent, and utility bills, and also increases the likelihood
of consumers delaying necessary medical and dental care as well as prescription drug
purchases); Dennis Campbell et al., Bouncing Out of the Banking System: An Empirical
Analysis of Involuntary Bank Account Closures 6 (Dec. 3, 2008) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1335873 (the presence of
payday lending is positively associated with bank account closures).
37 SHAPIRO, supra note 33, at 12-13. Shapiro insists that in order to address this
limitation the analysis needs accurate, individual-level data that can link payday-loan
borrowing with other variables. However, because those data are unavailable to researchers,
they must "make various assumptions about financial distress and access to other forms of
credit, which in turn weaken their findings." Id. at 13. Indeed, some studies have attempted
to address the shortcomings that most payday-lending analyses suffer from by developing a
"kind of laboratory environment" in which the researchers try to control for other variables.
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empirical research on the welfare effects of payday lending, it is indisputable
that the payday-lending industry has grown considerably over the last two
decades in response to high levels of consumer demand for its products. This
demand is quite high among residents who have "little or no precautionary
savings to draw on for emergencies" and have less access to the conventional
sources of credit that their more prosperous counterparts use to help alleviate
their financial problems. 38
B. The Geography of Payday Lending
To understand the ubiquity of payday lenders and other AFSPs in certain
communities, it is important to understand the way in which supply and demand
for these financial products interact with the demographics of the populations
served. This Section examines the demographic factors that influence the
geography of payday lending, including the presence or absence of traditional
commercial banks near these populations.
A key assumption of the literature on AFSPs is that payday lenders and
similar firms tend to locate close to their potential customer base. The closer
that payday lenders are to potential customers, the more apt are those customers
to visit these storefronts.39 The same arguably can be said of traditional banks
and lenders. Therefore, we might expect to see commercial bank branches and
payday lenders occupy different neighborhoods at different rates if their
potential customer bases are distinct. Likewise, we might expect to see both
alternative and traditional financial services institutions in the same
neighborhoods if their customer bases overlap.
Id. at 15; see also Bart J. Wilson et al., An Experimental Analysis of the Demand for Payday
Loans, 10 B.E. J. ECON. ANALYSIS & POL'Y 1 (2010) (concluding that access to payday loans
increases the probability of financial survival by thirty-one percent, as a larger portion of the
participants with hypothetical access to payday loans survived financially, while those
without access to loans were at a "nontrivially higher risk" of being unable to manage and
survive financial setbacks); see also Peterson, supra note 7, at 922-23 (noting the difficulty
of tracking borrowers because borrowers are reluctant and unable to self-report their
economic difficulties, tend to change jobs and relocate more often than affluent families, and
payday lenders do not report borrowers' repayment patterns with national credit bureaus).
38 SHAPIRO, supra note 33, at 7; see THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, REPORT No. 2,
PAYDAY LENDING IN AMERICA: How BORROWERS CHOOSE AND REPAY PAYDAY LOANS 9
(2013) [hereinafter PEW BORROWERS] (quoting a borrower who says, "I'm like everybody
else, living paycheck to paycheck, still not having enough to come through at the end"); see
also PEW POLICY SOLUTIONS, supra note 29.
39 See, e.g., WEI LI ET AL., CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, PREDATORY PROFILING:
THE ROLE OF RACE AND ETHNICITY IN THE LOCATION OF PAYDAY LENDERS IN CALIFORNIA 7
(2009), available at http://www.responsiblelending.org/california/ca-payday/research-analy
sis/predatory-profiling-exec-summary.pdf (citing a survey of California payday-loan
borrowers in which "the leading reason a customer chose a particular store was because they
'saw a payday location and went in').
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Payday lenders tend to be located in urban areas and close to economically
vulnerable populations, as these groups constitute the vast majority of short-
term lenders' customer base. A number of studies and analyses find that payday
lenders are clustered disproportionately near communities consisting of low-
and middle-income populations, African-Americans, Latinos, immigrants, and
members of the military. 40 Many in these populations tend to be "unbanked" or
"underbanked," 41 face liquidity challenges, are burdened with an impaired
credit history, or face institutional barriers that make it difficult to qualify for
traditional loan products. 42 As such, it is not surprising that these groups
constitute a disproportionate number of payday-lending consumers. 43
40 See id. at 25 (payday lenders tend to cluster in African-American and Latino
communities); KENNETH TEMKIN & NOAH SAWYER, FANNIE MAE FOUND., ANALYSIS OF
ALTERNATIVE FINANCIAL SERVICE PROVIDERS 3 (2004), available at http://www.urban.org/
UploadedPDF/410935_AltFinServProviders.pdf (AFSPs tend to cluster in neighborhoods
with minority and low-income residents; this finding holds true regardless of a city's
geographic location or socioeconomic composition); Mark L. Burkey & Scott P. Simkins,
Factors Affecting the Location of Payday Lending and Traditional Banking Services in
North Carolina, 34 REV. REGIONAL STUD. 191, 198 (2004) (areas with a higher density of
payday lenders tend to have higher concentrations of recent immigrants); see also Alice
Gallmeyer & Wade T. Roberts, Payday Lenders and Economically Distressed Communities:
A Spatial Analysis of Financial Predation, 46 Soc. SCI. J. 521, 529 (2009) (payday lenders
are more likely to populate neighborhoods that have lower income, moderate poverty, and
higher percentages of ethnic minorities, immigrants, young adults, elderly, military
personnel, and those working in non-management or professional occupations); Ellen E.
Schultz & Theo Francis, Social Insecurity: High-Interest Lenders Tap Elderly, Disabled,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 12, 2008, at Al (noting that in many states payday lenders cluster around
subsidized housing complexes for the elderly and disabled). But see THOMAS E. LEHMAN,
CONSUMER CREDIT RESEARCH FOUND., A CRITIQUE OF "RACE MATTERS: THE
CONCENTRATION OF PAYDAY LENDERS IN AFRICAN-AMERICAN NEIGHBORHOODS IN NORTH
CAROLINA" 9-11 (2006), available at http://www.creditresearch.org/editor/assets/files/060
209Critique of RaceMattersFINAL.pdf (some studies challenged as flawed on the basis
of their overreliance on bivariate studies and the failure to control for key neighborhood
characteristics which may skew the correlation between ethnicity and location).
41 A recent FDIC study concludes that "more than one in four households (28.3
percent) are either unbanked or underbanked, conducting some or all of their financial
transactions outside of the mainstream banking system." FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., 2011
FDIC NATIONAL SURVEY OF UNBANKED AND UNDERBANKED HOUSEHOLDS 4 (2012).
42 See generally MICHAEL S. BARR ET AL., INSUFFICIENT FUNDS: SAVINGS, ASSETS,
CREDIT, AND BANKING AMONG LOW-INCOME HOUSEHOLDS (Rebecca M. Blank & Michael
S. Barr eds., 2009).
43 A number of studies find that payday loan users tend to be low- and middle-income,
members of ethnic minority groups (namely African-Americans), young and middle-aged,
renters, and military personnel. See, e.g., AMANDA LOGAN & CHRISTIAN E. WELLER, CTR.
FOR AM. PROGRESS, WHO BORROWS FROM PAYDAY LENDERS?: AN ANALYSIS OF NEWLY
AVAILABLE DATA 5-10 (2009); Matthew B. Gross et al., Who Uses Alternative Financial
Services, and Why?, 58 CONSUMER INTERESTS ANN. (2012), available at http://www.consum
erinterests.org/assets/docs/CLA/CIA2012/2012-57%20who%20uses%20altemative%20finan
cial%20services%20and%20why.pdf; Edward C. Lawrence & Gregory Elliehausen, A
Comparative Analysis of Payday Loan Customers, 26 CONTEMP. ECON. POL'Y 299, 305-06
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One explanation for why payday lenders and other AFSPs have clustered in
certain neighborhoods is that more traditional financial service branches have
decamped in significant numbers from these neighborhoods. Notably, the
payday-lending industry emerged during the 1990s in response to the
withdrawal of traditional lenders from the small-loan market.44 Payday lenders
and other AFSPs are thus arguably responding to an unmet demand by serving
the underbanked in the absence of the availability or accessibility of similar
products and services from traditional lenders. 45 In other words, payday lenders
are filling a "spatial void" left by the departure of these banks.
The evidence on the existence of a spatial void is fairly convincing, if more
nuanced than the term "spatial void" suggests. Many studies have compared the
location of AFSPs with that of traditional banks in a variety of local and
regional markets. Most of these studies have found that banks are not
completely absent from neighborhoods where AFSPs-particularly payday
lenders and check-cashing firms-tend to concentrate. However, when
compared to other neighborhoods with different demographics, banks are
relatively less concentrated in areas where AFSPs are most concentrated.46
Given the presence of both traditional banks and AFSPs in many
(2008); Michael A. Stegman, Payday Lending, 21 J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 2007, at 169,
173-74. It should be noted, however, that payday loans to military personnel have been
illegal since 2008 and studies finding a high percentage of military payday customers
antedate the relevant law. See infra Part II.C.1 (discussing John Warner National Defense
Authorization Act of 2007).
4 4 GREGORY ELLIEHAUSEN & EDWARD C. LAWRENCE, CREDIT RESEARCH CTR.,
PAYDAY ADVANCE CREDIT IN AMERICA: AN ANALYSIS OF CUSTOMER DEMAND, at iv (2001).
45 It is worth noting that, in light of the rapid growth and success of the payday-lending
industry over the past two decades, several traditional banks and credit unions have
responded to the market by developing products with attractive loan terms. Generally,
however, these efforts have failed because in comparison to payday loans, competing
products offer far less in terms of convenience and privacy. Moreover, in certain cases,
competing products end up merely supplementing a consumer's collection of payday loans.
See Michael Kenneth, Payday Lending: Can "Reputable" Banks End Cycle of Debt?, 42
U.S.F. L. REV. 659, 661, 696 (2008); Victor Stango, Some New Evidence on Competition in
Payday Lending Markets, 30 CONTEMP. EcoN. POL'Y. 149, 149, 150-51, 158-60 (2012)
(similarly finding the inability of credit unions to compete with payday lenders).
46 See, e.g., Gregory D. Squires & Sally O'Connor, Fringe Banking in Milwaukee: The
Rise of Check-Cashing Businesses and Emergence of a Two-Tiered Banking System, 34
URB. AFF. REV. 126, 130 (1998) (noting that while there are two banks for every check-
cashing business in low-income and minority census tracts, there are roughly ten banks for
each check-cashing business in white areas). More specifically, the findings suggest that
traditional banks tend to concentrate in areas with higher median incomes and larger white
populations, while AFSPs tend to concentrate closer to lower-income and minority
populations. See TEMKIN & SAWYER, supra note 40, at 11-24; Burkey & Simkins, supra
note 40, at 203; Steven M. Graves, Landscapes of Predation, Landscapes of Neglect: A
Location Analysis of Payday Lenders and Banks, 55 PROF. GEOGRAPHER 303, 311-12
(2003); Tony E. Smith et al., Alternative Financial Service Providers and the Spatial Void
Hypothesis, 38 REGIONAL SCI. & URB. ECON. 205, 208-26 (2008).
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neighborhoods, it is fair to conclude that, at least to some extent, payday lenders
and other AFSPs appear to fill a financial services supply gap.
Evidence supporting the spatial void hypothesis, however, does not explain
why consumers who have geographic access to both traditional financial
services and AFSPs would use the services of the latter given the higher costs
associated with these products.47 Nor does it necessarily suggest why AFSPs
continue to enter markets where there is a robust traditional banking presence.48
The short answer is that even in neighborhoods heavily populated with
traditional banking sources, some populations make the understandable, and
even rational, choice to use alternative products over more traditional banking
products.
For one, "physical access to banks does not always translate into functional
access to financial services and products."49 In addition to the institutional
barriers faced by some demographic groups,50 many consumers prefer payday
loans because of their convenience, ease, and lack of borrower restrictions. 51
Indeed, one recent study found that borrowers' preference for payday loans over
similar credit union products is driven "most strongly by credit unions' shorter
hours of operation, a lack of privacy conferred [upon customers,] . . . and the
fact that defaulting on a credit union payday loan harms one's credit score." 52
The riskiness of payday loans therefore is discounted in favor of factors that
4 7 See Smith et al., supra note 46, at 206-07 (suggesting various possible answers to
this question); see also MATT FELLOWES & MIA MABANTA, BROOKINGS, BANKING ON
WEALTH: AMERICA'S NEW RETAIL BANKING INFRASTRUCTURE AND ITS WEALTH-BUILDING
POTENTIAL 1 (2008), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/
2008/1/banking%20fellowes/01 banking fellowes.pdf (finding that most AFSPs, like
payday lenders and check cashers, are located within one mile of a bank or credit union
branch and that more bank and credit union branches per capita are located in low-income
neighborhoods than in high-income neighborhoods).
48 Payday lenders appear to be locating in areas with banks, and there is evidence that
they are competing with these banks for low- and moderate-income customers. H. Evren
Damar, Why Do Payday Lenders Enter Local Markets? Evidence from Oregon, 34 REV.
INDUS. ORG. 173, 190 (2009) (payday lenders are more likely to locate in areas that have
more bank branches, larger populations, and higher percentage of Hispanics).
49 Jane Cover et al., Minorities on the Margins? The Spatial Organization of Fringe
Banking Services, 33 J. URB. AFF. 317, 340 (2011).
50 1d. (noting, particularly for immigrants, institutional barriers like identification
requirements or a credit history to open an account).
51 Stango, supra note 45, at 149, 150-51, 158-60 (finding evidence that most payday
borrowers have a strong preference for less restrictive but higher priced, more convenient,
standard payday loans even when faced with the choice of a similar credit union version of a
payday loan).
52 Id. at 151, 158-60 (responses to survey indicate that the most important "soft"
features of payday lenders are hours, privacy, and location); see also Edmiston, supra note
27, at 70 (noting that, unlike traditional lenders, payday lenders typically do not report to
credit agencies and thus seem less risky; in the event that finances do not improve over the
course of the loan period, defaulting on a payday loan would typically not harm the
borrower's formal credit standing).
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appear to decrease the time, effort, and social stigma associated with facing a
financial emergency.53
Moreover, it is not necessarily the case that traditional banking products
contain the most competitive terms for economically vulnerable populations.
Even when customers have equal access to traditional banking products, such as
overdraft credit protection, the associated fees and interest can be more
expensive than payday loans. 54 Similarly, the fees associated with exceeding the
credit limit on a credit card are in many cases significantly higher than the fee
on an equivalent payday loan.55 This evidence thus suggests that payday lenders
and other AFSPs need not depend on a spatial void to compete with more
traditional financial institutions. In other words, the existence and popularity of
payday lenders in many communities is not dependent on the absence of
traditional institutions. Both can and do coexist in the same geographic area,
with payday lenders able to compete with and provide a competitive substitute
for more traditional overdraft financial products.
C. The Regulation ofPayday Lending
As the previous sections explain, the popularity of payday lending can be
explained by a number of factors, including the diminished presence of
traditional lenders in some communities, the ease and convenience of payday
lending as compared to more traditional bank products, and the competitiveness
of payday-lending terms when compared to similar bank and credit union
products. The increased presence of payday lenders in many communities
across the country has prompted concern and action by many local
governmental officials. These local governments have sought to control the
presence and concentration of payday lenders through restrictive zoning
regulations that appear to fill a regulatory gap created by fairly permissive
federal and state regulation of the industry.
53 Fred Fernatt et al., A Risk-Tolerance Paradox: Are Payday and Car Title Loan
Customers Really More Risk Tolerant than Others? 3 INT'L REV. Soc. Scl. & HUMAN. 214,
225-26 (2012); Paige Marta Skiba & Jeremy Tobacman, Payday Loans, Uncertainty, and
Discounting: Explaining Patterns of Borrowing, Repayment, and Default 2 (Vanderbilt
Univ. Law Sch. Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 08-33, 2008), available at
http://www.vanderbilt.edulecon/sempapers/Skiba.pdf.
54 See, e.g., Marc Anthony Fusaro, Hidden Consumer Loans: An Analysis of Implicit
Interest Rates on Bounced Checks, 29 J. FAM. & EcoN. ISSUES 251, 251 (2008) (finding that
overdraft protection fees can be much more expensive than payday loans and that the median
implicit interest paid by Bounce Protection Program consumers is over 4000%); see also
BRIAN T. MELZER & DONALD P. MORGAN, COMPETITION IN A CONSUMER LOAN MARKET:
PAYDAY LOANS AND OVERDRAFT CREDIT 5 (2012).
55 See, e.g., Edmiston, supra note 27, at 71 ("As of March 2010, the average over-the-
limit fee was between $36 and $39. On a two-week, $100 loan, typical of most payday loans,
the effective rate of interest could exceed 1,000 percent.").
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1. The Limited Federal Regulation of Payday Lending
Historically, substantive federal regulation of the payday-loan industry has
been limited. The most important federal law regulating the payday-loan
industry is the Truth in Lending Act (TILA). 56 In 2000, with Congress's
authorization, the Federal Reserve Board clarified that payday loans constitute
credit for the purposes of TWA and, therefore, are subject to the statute's
disclosure requirements with respect to fees and finance charges.57 An
additional piece of significant federal legislation is the John Warner National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 (John Warner Act).58 In
response to the advocacy of military service members, Congress imposed a
thirty-six percent APR cap on payday loans to military personnel and their
dependents, which preempts any interest rates allowed under state usury
statutes. 59 Nonetheless, the law has little impact on the larger practice of payday
lending since the Act applies only to military personnel and their families.
Aside from the John Warner Act, however, no federal law regulates the interest
rates, fees, or other loan terms of the payday industry.
While the payday-lending industry historically has operated with virtually
no federal regulation of its terms,60 the recent establishment of the Consumer
56 Truth in Lending Act (TLA), Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146, 146-59 (1968)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667f (2012)).
57 See 65 Fed. Reg. 17129-01, 17130 (Mar. 31, 2000) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt.
226). Early case law indicates that payday lenders often asserted that their business
operations were outside the purview of TILA because, rather than extending consumer
credit, they merely were offering check-cashing services. Nonetheless, courts have held
almost unanimously that payday lending is an extension of credit governed by TILA and the
regulations promulgated thereunder. See, e.g., Hamilton v. York, 987 F. Supp. 953, 957
(E.D. Ky. 1997); Miller v. HLT Check Exchange (In re Miller), 215 B.R. 970, 974 (Bankr.
E.D. Ky. 1997).
58 Pub. L. No. 109-364, 120 Stat. 2083 (2012). For an argument that the payday-lending
industry targets financially vulnerable military families, see generally Stephen M. Graves &
Christopher L. Peterson, Predatory Lending and the Military: The Law and Geography of
"Payday" Loans in Military Towns, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 653 (2005).
59 The law effectively made it illegal to lend to military service personnel since it
prohibits the kind of fees and terms that have made the industry profitable. The key section
of the Act, Section 670, is entitled "Limitations on terms of consumer credit extended to
servicemembers and dependents." See 120 Stat. 2083. The Act also places strict disclosure
requirements on lenders, prohibits rollovers, and proscribes lenders from requiring
servicemembers to enter into agreements with mandatory arbitration clauses. See Allison S.
Woolston, Neither Borrower Nor Lender Be: The Future of Payday Lending in Arizona, 52
ARIZ. L. REv. 853, 859 (2010) (footnotes omitted) (for a brief background on the John
Warner Act).
60Payday lenders are of course regulated by many federal laws that are not specific to
the industry but nevertheless subject the industry to laws and regulations. These include the
Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (2012), as implemented by Regulation B,
12 C.F.R. pt. 202; the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 (2012); the Fair
Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. (2012); the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 15
U.S.C. § 6801 et seq. (2012); and the Electronic Fund Transfer Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1693 et seq.
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Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), a federal agency created under the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act) that
focuses solely on consumer financial protection, suggests that the federal
government might begin to step up its regulation of the industry.61 In recent
guidance, the CFPB has acknowledged that it intends to exercise fully its
regulatory authority over financial service providers, including its authority to
examine them for compliance with Title X of the Dodd-Frank Act, which
prohibits unfair, deceptive, and abusive acts and practices. 62 The CFPB just
recently expanded its probe of the auto-lending industry, focusing on the sale of
financial products like extended warranties, suggesting that the agency is likely
to aggressively implement its supervision and regulatory authority over various
kinds of lenders.63 Yet, for all of its recent warnings, it is questionable how
aggressively the CFPB can regulate the payday-lending industry given that the
agency lacks statutory authority to regulate interest rates.
2. State Authorization, Toleration, and Prohibition
Although TWA and the John Warner Act specifically regulate payday
lenders to some extent, most of the regulatory control of the industry occurs at
the state level. State legislation governs both licensing and lending practices of
the industry. While state payday-lending laws vary greatly, they can be
classified into three general categories: (1) explicit toleration; (2) informal
prohibition; and (3) complete prohibition.
(2012), as implemented by Regulation E, 12 C.F.R. pt. 205, as well as Section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2012).
61 The CFPB's regulatory authority and enforcement arm applies to large banks, large
credit unions and their affiliates, and non-bank entities that offer or provide consumer
financial products or services. Thus, for the first time, non-banks engaging in financial
transactions, including mortgage brokers, private education lenders, credit card companies,
and payday lenders, are subject to federal supervision and regulation. With respect to its
enforcement power, the CFPB can conduct joint investigations, issue subpoenas and civil
demands, bring cease and desist and injunction proceedings, and conduct hearings.
Furthermore, the CFPB has the authority to bring civil proceedings in the U.S. district
courts, or in any state court in a district where the defendant is located, resides, or is
conducting business to seek relief for violations of federal consumer financial laws. Lauren
E. Galeoto et al., The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: The New Sheriff in Town, 129
BANKING L.J. 702, 703-04, 706 (2012).
62 See 12 U.S.C. § 553 1(a) (Supp. IV 2011); see CFPB WHITE PAPER, supra note 5, at
45.
63 The CPFB also warned auto lenders against high-interest loans in March 2013,
opining that the practice discriminates against certain minority groups. See Robin Sidel &
Alan Zibel, Regulators Scrutinize Auto Lenders Over Add-Ons, WALL ST. J., May 3, 2013, at
Al. According to some practitioners, as the CFPB "evolves and the meaning of 'abusive'
morphs into a more concrete meaning," parties within the agency's purview can "best
protect themselves by engaging in best practices that comply with the Bureau's guidance."
Galeoto et al., supra note 61, at 708.
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The most common pattern in recent years has been the explicit
authorization of payday lending through state enabling legislation. 64 Generally,
these statutes set maximum loan amounts, restrict the number of permissible
rollovers, and place ceilings on fees and finance charges. 65 The second most
common pattern is the informal prohibition of payday lending through the
application of usury laws that require lenders to comply with interest rate caps
on consumer loans. 66 The final regulatory regime that state legislatures have
adopted is to prohibit explicitly payday lending. In these states, payday lending
is illegal anywhere within the state's borders.67
Even when payday lending is prohibited, effectively or explicitly, lenders
have been able to circumvent state usury ceilings and make loans through the
Internet and toll-free telephone numbers. Indeed, the rise of online payday
lending raises the question whether state bans and restrictions merely drive
potential storefront customers to online borrowing.68 Some have argued that
64 Thirty-eight states currently have laws that permit payday lending and directly
regulate payday lenders. See Payday Lending Statutes, NAT'L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES,
http://www.ncsl.org/research/financial-services-and-commerce/payday-lending-state-stat
utes.aspx (last updated Sept. 12, 2013).
65 For example, Michigan's "Deferred Presentment Service Transactions Act" limits
loan amounts to $600 in a thirty-one day period and permits lenders to charge up to fifteen
percent in service fees, depending on the size of the loan. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 487.2153
(2005).
66 The eight states that currently fall into this category are: Connecticut, Maryland,
Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Vermont, and West Virginia.
Generally, the prohibition takes the form of a usury limit on all consumer loans, with no
specific carve out for payday lending. New York provides one of the clearest examples of
this type of regulation. While New York does not have specific payday-lending legislation,
the legislature has imposed a sixteen percent interest rate cap on small loans which
essentially makes payday lending illegal in the state. See N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-501(1)
(McKinney 2011); N.Y. BANKING LAW § 14-1(1) (McKinney 2012). However, because of
under-enforcement, special loopholes, or both, payday lending remains a prominent industry
in some of these states. See, e.g., John Sandman, Is the Payday Loan Business on the
Ropes?, REUTERS (Sept. 21, 2012, 12:03 PM), http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2012/
09/21/is-the-payday-loan-business-on-the-ropes/ (stating that even after then-New York
Attorney General, Andrew Cuomo, settled with two out-of-state payday lenders in 2009, the
parties "simply resurfaced in some other form").
67 Five jurisdictions currently fall into this category: Arizona (ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 6-1263 (2010)); Arkansas (ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-52-101-23-52-117 (2013)); District of
Columbia (D.C. CODE § 26-319(a) (2014)); Georgia (GA. CODE ANN. § 16-17-1 (2004)); and
North Carolina (N.C. GEN. STAT. § 53-166(a) (2013)). Georgia's Payday Lending Act of
2004, for instance, states that "the practice of engaging in activities commonly referred to as
payday lending, deferred presentment services, or advance cash services and other similar
activities are currently illegal." GA. CODE ANN. § 16-17-1(e).
68 A relatively recent report by the PEW Charitable Trusts indicates that sixteen percent
of U.S. payday-loan borrowers obtained their loans online in 2011. PEW BORROWERS, supra
note 38. It is estimated that in 2011, the volume of online payday loans was $13 billion, up
more than 120 percent from $5.8 billion in 2006. See Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Major Banks
Aid in Payday Loans Banned by States, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2013, http://www.ny
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turning to online payday loans is not in the best interest of consumers since
online lenders operating outside of the jurisdiction of state regulation generally
are able to charge higher fees and do not offer as much consumer protection as
provided by regulated storefront lenders. 69 The online payday-lending industry
believes, however, that its products can be superior to those offered by payday-
lender storefronts precisely because the lack of regulation allows them to offer
longer-term loans (thus avoiding rollovers) with fully disclosed rates and costs.
Regardless of the merits of these arguments, online lenders have emerged as
another source of short-term financing and operate largely outside of any state's
regulatory reach.
3. Local Zoning Restrictions as Consumer Regulation
While federal and state legislation has curbed some of the problems that
critics associate with payday lending, many city councilmembers and consumer
advocates concerned with the number and location of payday-lending
businesses believe that these statutes have not gone far enough. Several local
governments have responded to the growth of the industry by imposing
restrictions of their own on payday lenders. Because local governments are
limited in their ability to regulate the terms of payday loans directly,70 they have
turned to the one quintessential source of local authority that they possess-the
power to regulate land within their boundaries-in order to address the spread
of payday lenders in their communities. 71
times.com/2013/2/24/business/major-banks-aid-in-payday-loans-banned-by-states.html?_
r-0. Moreover, a growing number of lenders are setting up online operations either in the
more "hospitable states" or offshore in "far-flung locales," such as Belize, Malta, and the
West Indies, in order to more easily skirt statewide interest rate caps and attract the largest
number of customers possible. Id.; see also Kevin Wack, Payday Lenders Assail Online
Competitors, AM. BANKER (Mar. 4, 2013), http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/178_43/
payday-lenders-assail-online-competitors-1057212-1.html.
69 See, e.g., Shane M. Mendenhall, Payday Loans: The Effects ofPredatory Lending on
Society and the Need for More State and Federal Regulation, 32 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 299,
312-14 (2007) (explaining how the payday-lending industry has followed recent
technological advances to offer payday loans via the Internet and discussing the ways in
which Internet payday loans can be especially risky to borrowers). In December 2012, for
instance, Minnesota's attorney general settled with one online lender over claims that the
lender was operating without a license to make loans with effective annual interest rates as
high as 1564%. Silver-Greenberg, supra note 68. Arkansas' attorney general also sued
several online lenders in January 2012, alleging that the businesses were breaking state law
by charging fees in excess of the state's seventeen percent annual interest rate cap. Id.
70 See infra notes 76-77.
71 As Nestor Davidson has argued, local governments often react to the legal-structural
constraints they face by "apply[ing] traditional legal tools in novel ways when barred from
responding to problems more directly" rather than taking the scope of their legal authority as
a given. Nestor M. Davidson, Leaps and Bounds, 108 MICH. L. REV. 957, 958 (2010)
(citation omitted) (reviewing GERALD E. FRUG & DAVID J. BARRON, CITY BOUND: How
STATES STIFLE URBAN INNOVATION (2008)).
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Many municipalities, for instance, recently have enacted moratoria on the
development of new payday-loan businesses. 72 Dozens of local governments
have responded to the growth of the industry by imposing land-use restrictions
on where payday lenders may locate. 73 Because payday-loan businesses
generally are considered commercial uses, municipalities are able to exclude
such offices from residential districts without difficulty. 74 However, although
courts have upheld ordinances that effectively exclude payday lenders from
certain districts, cities that attempt to prohibit payday lenders from all
commercial districts may face some judicial scrutiny.7 5 The issue of preemption
also looms large when localities are considering how to regulate payday
lenders. Generally, courts will invalidate a zoning ordinance on preemption
grounds if such ordinance conflicts with a state law that explicitly allows
72 Such ordinances, which officials refer to as "interim zoning" or "stop-gap" measures,
permit local governments to maintain the status quo until they have time to examine and
adopt new land-use regulations. These stop-gap measures also preclude payday lenders from
rushing to submit license applications before more restrictive zoning laws go into effect.
Amy Lavine, Zoning Out Payday Loan Stores and Other Alternative Financial Services
Providers 8 (July 13, 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (citation omitted), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1885197. For examples, see
YOUNGTOWN, ARIZ., CODE § 17.16.040(D) (2002) ("Nonchartered financial services are not
a permitted use in any class of district within town boundaries."); BELLEFONTAINE, MO.,
CODE § 29-9 (2010) ("A business, other than a pawnbroker operating in conformity with this
zoning code, engaged in providing short-term loans to the public as a primary or substantial
element of its business and which is not licensed by the appropriate state or federal agency
as a banking or savings and loan facility, including ... payday lenders . .. shall be
prohibited in all zoning districts of the city of Bellefontaine Neighbors, Missouri.").73 Courts have consistently upheld identical zoning restrictions on check-cashing
businesses and, even in the absence of specific limitations on payday lenders, have reasoned
that payday-lending businesses are governed by the same laws. See, e.g., Roman Check
Cashing, Inc. v. N.J. Dep't of Banking & Ins., 777 A.2d 1, 6-8 (N.J. 2001); Fin. Servs.,
L.L.C. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 741 A.2d 121, 126-28 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1999);
EZMONEY Wis., Inc. v. City of Wauwatosa Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 321 Wis. 2d 477, 477
(Ct. App. 2009).
74 Moreover, cities that also wish to exclude payday lenders from certain historic
districts, mixed-use districts, and various specialty commercial districts can generally do so
without much legal scrutiny. See Lavine, supra note 72, at 12.
75 Courts treat the total exclusion of lawful uses with some suspicion. Hawthorne v.
Vill. of Olympia Fields, 790 N.E.2d 832, 841, 844 (Ill. 2003) (holding that the total
exclusion of daycare homes exceeded the village's authority); English v. Augusta Twp., 514
N.W.2d 172, 174 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994) (recognizing that a zoning ordinance "may not
totally exclude a lawful land use where (1) there is a demonstrated need for the land use in
the township or surrounding area, and (2) the use is appropriate for the location"); State ex
rel. Sunshine Enters. of Mo., Inc. v. Bd. of Adjustment of St. Ann, 64 S.W.3d 310, 311-12
(Mo. 2002) (city cannot deny a payday lender a license to operate where the lender's
services constituted both a "personal services" use and a "bank" use and thus qualified as a
permitted by-right use in the subject zoning district).
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payday lenders to operate. 76 Local governments are also preempted from
directly regulating the rates that these lenders charge because both federal and
state legislation often occupy the field of usury regulation. 77
Given that zoning ordinances are not immune from preemption, rather than
outright excluding payday lenders, local governments have opted to impose
various types of restrictive zoning provisions designed to exclude, disperse, or
limit the number of payday lenders in a given municipality. To the extent that
most of the recent ordinances are aimed at breaking up payday-lender
concentrations, and not simply with reducing negative spillovers to the
neighborhood "commons," the next Part examines whether breaking up payday
agglomerations has the potential to enhance consumer protection by effectively
shielding consumers, through physical separation, from payday lenders.
III. BREAKING UP PAYDAY
Local governments have reacted to the concentration of payday lenders by
limiting their proximity to one another and to most other land uses. The intent
of these ordinances is to break up payday concentrations and, in the process, to
drive these businesses away from local residents altogether. This Part will
explore whether payday zoning restrictions are likely to accomplish their
manifest purpose of protecting consumers from payday lenders. An examination
of the location pattern and distribution of California's payday lenders, both
before and after the passage of local zoning ordinances, provides a small
window into this question. This study of California payday-lender location
lends great skepticism to the claim that zoning ordinances designed to disrupt or
prevent payday-lender concentrations shield or protect consumers from payday
lenders.
76See, e.g., Sunshine, 64 S.W.3d at 314 (state law authorizing under-$500 lenders
preempted the city's ordinance, which prohibited payday lending in all of the city's zoning
districts).
77 Some cities have imposed restrictions on lending practices, including interest rate
and fee caps and provisions permitting borrowers to cancel their loans. See, e.g., CLAYTON,
OHIO, ORDINANCE No. 0-03-08-07 § 731.08(a)(3), 731.12(a) (2008). Such regulations are
quite susceptible to preemption challenges, however. See, e.g., Advance Am., Cash Advance
Ctrs. of Fla., Inc. v. Seminole Cnty., Fla., Case No. 00-CA-1665-16-L (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2001)
(finding unconstitutional on preemption grounds a municipality's ordinance which regulated
various remunerative and consumer protection aspects of payday-lending services governed
by state law). Not only are local governments preempted from acting in ways inconsistent
with state law, but states are also limited in this area of consumer financial protection by
federal laws. See, e.g., Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act, 12
U.S.C. § 1735f-7a(a)(1) (2012) (preempting some state usury laws); Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1044 (2012) (allowing preemption
of "state consumer financial laws" under certain circumstances).
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A. Anti-concentration Ordinances
One straightforward way of avoiding payday-lender concentrations is to
limit the number of such businesses that can operate within a given
municipality. Local governments accomplish this with strict caps on the number
of permissible payday lenders (e.g., a maximum of two payday-loan stores in
the city) or on a per capita basis (e.g., one payday-loan store for every 5000
residents). 78 In the absence of payday-lender caps, however, one of the more
common strategies to avoid payday-lender concentration is to impose separation
or distance restrictions.
Separation or distance restrictions are designed to prevent the concentration
of payday lenders-a problem that exclusionary zoning strategies tend to
exacerbate by forcing these businesses into particular areas of a municipality. 79
Such restrictions do so by prohibiting new payday lenders from operating
within close proximity to existing payday lenders, or to similar businesses,
usually requiring them to be between 500 feet and one mile apart. 80
Separation or distance ordinances can also control the density of payday
lenders by making it difficult for payday lenders to locate anywhere within the
municipality. Many recently passed zoning restrictions prohibit payday lenders
from locating in close proximity to most other kinds of allowable land uses-
including residential areas, hotels and motels, museums, landmarks, schools and
similar educational institutions, churches and other places of worship, parks,
other state or federally chartered banks, and other financial institutions (e.g.,
credit unions and savings associations).81
78 See, e.g., AMERICAN FORK CITY, UTAH, DEV. CODE § 2-5.46(B)(4) (2008) ("Check
cashing and other similar businesses .. . [s]hall be limited to one Check Cashing or other
similar business per 10,000 in population, to include all residents in American Fork City
within the City's geographic boundaries."); SAN JOSE, CAL. ORDINANCE tit. 20, ch. 20.70,
20.80, 20.200.875 (2012) (caps the number of outlets at current level; new owner can move
into existing lending site within six months of vacancy, otherwise lender must be one-fourth
mile from other lender and low-income areas).
79 Some local ordinances require that payday-loan stores be located in shopping centers
or multi-tenant commercial buildings. GLADSTONE, MO., ORDINANCE No. 4.036 (2007);
CLARK COUNTY, NEV., § 30.44.020 (2005); CLAYTON, OHIO, ORDINANCE No. 0-03-08-07,§ 731.10 (2008); COLUMBIA, S.C., ORDINANCE No. 2009-109, § 17-294 (2009).
80 See, e.g., CLAYTON, OHIO, ORDINANCE 0-03-08-07, § 731.11 (2008) ("No permit
shall be issued for any Payday Lender that is located within one thousand (1,000) feet of any
other Payday Lender Business...."); LITTLE ELM, TEX., CODE § 106-35 (2010) ("A lot
containing an alternative financial service shall be located at least 1,000 feet from any lot
containing another alternative financial service. . . .").
8 1See, e.g., SouTH TUCSON, ARIZ., ORDINANCE § 24-526 (2010) ("No non-chartered
financial institution use group will be within one thousand (1,000) feet of any other non-
chartered financial institution use group, nor permitted within five hundred (500) feet of any
residential zone, public playground, and/or park."); LA MIRADA, CAL., CODE § 21.45.020
(2008) ("No check cashing establishment shall be located within five hundred feet .. . of any
school, church, state- or federal-chartered bank, loan institution, savings association, credit
union, or brokerage house."); AMES, IOWA, ORDINANCE No. 4111, § 29.1312 (2012)
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Given that payday lenders already are concentrated in many municipalities
and within commercial zones in those municipalities, one might ask how these
zoning measures operate to de-concentrate existing firms. One means of doing
so is to impose discretionary permit review or renewal, which requires that even
existing lenders are subject to special conditions to continue operating. 82 These
mechanisms also give local governments flexibility to ensure that proposed
payday-lending businesses will be compatible with neighboring uses and that
negative externalities will be mitigated through constraints on these businesses'
design and operation. 83
By making it difficult to locate in a particular jurisdiction and by imposing
more demanding operational requirements and restrictions, we might expect to
see a reduction in the number of payday stores opening and operating in a given
jurisdiction in the years following the enactment of the zoning ordinance. We
might also expect to see payday stores dispersing at a rate, and a distance, that
makes it far less convenient and more costly for local residents to locate and
patronize payday lenders. Alternatively, we would want to know whether
payday lenders are simply moving to nearby municipalities without such
ordinances, raising the question whether these ordinances are simply
redistributing lenders around the region, or the state. These questions will be
explored in the next Part, which takes a snapshot of the impact of zoning
restrictions on payday lenders in California.
B. The California Experience
Based on publicly available data, this Part examines the location and
distribution of payday lenders in California both before and after the enactment
(requiring outlets to be more than 1000 feet from schools, childcare centers, other payday
lenders, land zoned for residential uses, any arterial street, commercial highway zones, and
overlay districts). Still others require payday lenders to be located a fair distance away from
adult businesses and liquor stores to avert high concentrations of disfavored commercial uses
and preclude borrowers from spending their loans on certain products and services. See, e.g.,
RIVERSIDE, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 19.280.030(A)(3) (2007) ("The business shall be
located a minimum distance of 1,000 feet from any existing ... businesses licensed by the
State of California for off- or on-sale of alcoholic beverages . . ."); OCEANSIDE, CAL.,
ZONING ORDINANCE, art. 36, §§ 3601, 3604 (2008) (requires special operating permit for
payday lenders classified as adult businesses; not permitted within 1000 feet of similar
businesses or within 500 feet of home, church, park, or school).
82 See, e.g., CUYAHOGA FALLS, OHIO, GEN. DEV. CODE § 1131.03.H (2009) (requiring
initial as well as periodic review to ensure continued appropriateness of the permit; in
deciding whether to issue a permit, and whether to add mitigating conditions, the city can
consider factors such as the general character of the area, unique attributes of the lot, specific
building, design, or sign features that make the use more appropriate, buffering or screening
to minimize the impact of the use, and any special operational requirements).
83 These development procedures also allow community members to become involved
in the process, as notice, hearings, and appeals procedures are commonplace. Community
members that want to object to new stores can try to convince zoning officials not to permit
any new additional businesses under these procedures. Lavine, supra note 72, at 20.
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of zoning ordinances that impose separation and distance requirements on new
payday stores.84 This examination reveals that a correlation exists between the
passage of restrictive zoning ordinances and a significant reduction in the
presence of new payday-lending businesses in the municipality with the zoning
restriction. This examination also reveals a similar reduction in the number of
new payday lenders in cities within close proximity (5-10 miles) of a
municipality with payday zoning restrictions. Because this reduction might be
attributable to the impact of the recent economic downturn, which happens to
coincide with the time period following the passage of many of these zoning
ordinances, this Part also examines the distribution of payday lenders in other
municipalities around the state that have not passed a restrictive zoning
ordinance nor are located in close proximity to a city that has such ordinance.
The result of this empirical examination supports the conclusion that
restrictive zoning ordinances have failed, even in a recession, to drive payday
lenders away from local residents. The data also, however, strongly suggest that
the recent economic downturn has had an independent effect on the number of
new payday lenders entering local markets post-2008, regardless of whether
there is a restrictive zoning ordinance in place. In any event, whether on account
of these ordinances or the impact of the recession, or both, it is clear that the
number of payday-lending businesses across California has been in decline over
the past decade. Nevertheless, it is also clear that payday lenders continue to
enter into local markets and to concentrate within them, whether or not a
restrictive zoning ordinance is in effect. This analysis raises considerable doubt
about the effectiveness of zoning ordinances which limit payday-lender
concentrations in achieving the consumer protection goals that animate them.
Payday lending began in California as an extension of the check-cashing
industry in the 1990s and has since become widespread.85 State lawmakers
enacted the 2003 California Deferred Deposit Transaction Law (CDDTL),
84 The data used to assess the location pattern and distribution of payday lenders in
California came from the state's Department of Corporations. Search for a Financial
Services Licensee, CAL. DEP'T Bus. OVERSIGHT, front matter, http://www.dbo.ca.gov/FSD/
licensees/default.asp (last visited Jan. 20, 2014). The Department licenses and regulates
payday lenders in the state of California, among other financial services and securities
businesses. Some of the information obtained for this study was collected from the
Department's website, while other information was obtained through a public information
request. The data obtained lists the name, address, license number, and license date of every
payday lender in the state. If a lender has been removed from the Department's active
license listing, the data indicates that the lender has either "surrendered" its license or the
license was "revoked" and records the date on which the license became inactive.
8 5 LESLIE COOK ET AL., REPORT ON THE STATUS OF PAYDAY LENDING IN CALIFORNIA 4-
5 (2009). The Department of Corporations estimated that there were approximately 2500
payday-lending businesses in the state by the end of 2006. Id. at 5. Moreover, in 2006 alone,
roughly one million Californians had received payday loans (at an average of ten loans per
borrower). Id. Insight, the Center for Community and Economic Development, also has
noted that each year roughly 12.7% of California households take out one or more loans with
a payday lender.
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which provides that the maximum loan amount a payday lender can issue to a
consumer is $300 and the maximum fee that a payday lender can charge is
fifteen percent of the face amount of the check.86 Following the enactment of
CDDTL, a number of municipalities moved to limit the number of payday-
lending outlets by adopting "distance" ordinances.87 Oakland was the first city,
in 2004, to adopt distance restrictions designed to curb the spread of payday
lending within the city's borders,88 and a number of other local governments
soon followed.89 Among those that have adopted ordinances restricting payday
lenders from locating within a certain distance of each other and other land uses
since 2004 are: La Mirada, 90 Norwalk,91 Pico Rivera,92 San Francisco, 93 and
Sacramento. 94
8 6 This means that the largest amount of loan principal that a lender can advance at the
highest fee permitted by law is $255 ($45 fee). The CDDTL also prohibits late fees, interest,
and rollovers. California Deferred Deposit Transaction Law, CAL. FIN. CODE § 23035 (West
2004).
87 Because the CDDTL regulates the monetary aspects of payday lending, local
government officials legally cannot alter interest rates or impose financially based
limitations and, therefore, have attempted to regulate payday lending by amending their
zoning ordinances.
88 In addition to requiring a special use permit for check cashers and payday lenders,
the 2004 ordinance provides that these two kinds of businesses must be at least 1000 feet
from each other and at least 500 feet from a host of other kind of land uses. These include:
(1) community education civic activities; (2) state and federally chartered banks, savings
associations, credit unions, and industrial loan companies; (3) community assembly civic
activities; and (4) liquor stores. OAKLAND, CAL., PLANNING CODE § 17.102.430 (2004).
891t should be noted that several other municipalities in California, including Long
Beach, Los Angeles, Oceanside, Rialto, and San Diego, have passed zoning laws that
primarily impose special permit procedures which give officials flexibility to make sure that
payday-lending businesses are consistent with neighboring uses and that any negative effects
will be reduced through conditions on the stores' design and operation.
90 LA MIRADA, CAL., CODE § 21.45.020 (2008) (requires a minimum distance of 1000
feet between any two payday-lending businesses and a minimum distance of 500 feet
between payday-lending outlets and schools, churches, state or federally chartered banks,
loan institutions, savings associations, credit unions, and brokerage houses).
9 1NORWALK, CAL., CODE § 17.04.095 (2010) (limits the total number of payday-
lending establishments that may operate in the city to eight, restricts payday-lending
establishments to certain zones, and requires that payday-lending establishments be no less
than 1320 feet from each other).
92 Pico RIVERA, CAL., CODE § 18.40.050(C) (2009) (restricts payday lenders to certain
zones and requires a minimum distance of 2640 feet between any two payday-lending
outlets).
93 S.F., CAL., PLANNING CODE § 249.35 (2008) (prohibits payday lenders' location in
certain "Restricted Use Districts" and requires that new payday-lending outlets be located at
least a quarter mile-1320 feet-from any existing "fringe financial service").
94 SACRAMENTO, CAL., ORDINANCE 2009-017 (2009) (payday-lending and check-
cashing businesses may not be established or located within 1000 feet of any other check-
cashing or payday-lending business; church or faith congregation; school; or financial
institution, including state or federally chartered banks, savings associations, or credit
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After Oakland became the first city in California to set minimum distance
requirements for payday-lending outlets, the number of payday lenders moving
into the city decreased dramatically. In particular, the California Department of
Corporations (DOC) issued twenty licenses to payday lenders in Oakland in
2004-the year that the city's zoning ordinance went into effect. 95 The
following year, however, only two new payday-lending businesses moved into
the city of Oakland. Since 2004, only fifteen licensees have set up shop as
payday lenders in Oakland, and of those fifteen outlets, only seven currently are
licensed to operate. As a result, although the DOC issued thirty-five payday
licenses between 2004 and 2012, only sixteen of those licenses were active as of
December 31, 2012. This represents a 55% reduction in active payday licenses
in Oakland since the passage of the ordinance, marking a substantial decline in
the number of such businesses operating within the locality.96
At the same time, since the enactment of Oakland's zoning ordinance, the
number of new payday-lending outlets has also declined in neighboring cities
(within a ten-mile radius of Oakland), although not quite as dramatically. San
Leandro, for instance, a city roughly one-fifth the size of Oakland, has seen a
significant decline in the number of payday lenders opening for business in the
city. Specifically, while the DOC issued five payday-lending licenses in 2004
alone, only seven in total were issued in the ensuing seven years (2005-2012),
an average of one new license per year. Only five of twelve licenses are still
active, representing a mere 42% survival rate of active payday-lending
businesses in San Leandro since 2004. Likewise, the number of new licenses
issued to payday lenders declined in nearby Alameda, where the DOC issued
four licenses to payday lenders in Alameda in 2004 alone, but only a total of
seven in the ensuing seven years (2005-2012). Only four of the seven licenses
are still active, representing a 57% survival rate of active payday businesses
since 2004. The story is similar in Hayward, and to a lesser extent in Emeryville
and Berkeley, as the following table (Table 1) illustrates.
Moreover, this pattern is repeated, to varying degrees, in virtually every
municipality that has passed a restrictive zoning ordinance directed at the
payday-lending industry, as Table 1 illustrates. That is, subsequent to the
passage of a restrictive zoning ordinance, the number of new licenses issued to
payday lenders drops significantly, and sometimes dramatically, both in the city
unions; check cashers and payday lenders also may not be established or located within 500
feet of any existing residential zone).
95 The CDDTL became operative on December 31, 2004, and required that every
payday lender operating within the reach of this law must obtain a license by that date to
operate or continue operating. CAL. FIN. CODE § 23100 (West 2004). Thus, some lenders that
may have obtained licenses in 2004 could have already been in existence. It is not clear from
the data provided how many of these businesses were currently operating and how many
were just entering the market in 2004.
96 It is worth noting that the available data does not reveal how many payday-lending
businesses were in operation in Oakland at different points in time, such as 2004, 2008, and
2012.
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with the new law as well as in surrounding cities without such restrictions.
Table 1 presents the data on the number of licenses issued to payday lenders
within cities that have enacted distance ordinances and within closely proximate
cities-a ten-mile radius-both before and after passage of the ordinance.
Table 1: Licenses to "Deferred Deposit" Firms Within a Ten-Mile Radius of
Cities with Distance Ordinances
City (Date of Ordinance) New Licenses(Before Ordinance)
2004
Oakland (2004) 20
Alameda 4
San Leandro 5
Hayward 9
Emeryville 2
Berkeley 3
2004-2008
San Francisco (2008) 57
Daly City 9
South San Francisco 4
2004-2008
La Mirada (2008) 12
Fullerton 20
Bellflower 17
Buena Park 8
Whittier 12
2004-2009
Sacramento (2009) 125
Citrus Heights 27
Roseville 7
2004-2009
Pico Rivera (2009) 13
East Los Angeles 2
Montebello 13
Monterey Park 2
South El Monte 1
2004-2010
Norwalk (20 10) 18
Downey 7
Artesia 0
Paramount 1
Total 398
Source: California Department of Corporations
New Licenses
(After Ordinance)
2005-2012
15
3
7
8
0
1
2009-2012
3
0
0
2009-2012
1
4
0
1
0
2010-2012
3
3
1
2010-2012
0
1
3
1
2011-2012
0
3
1
1
61
Current Active Licenses
as of 12/312012
16
4
5
7
1
3
29
5
2
5
14
11
5
7
70
12
6
8
1
8
1
1
9
7
0
1
238
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There are two striking observations about these data. The first is the
obvious decline in the number of new licenses issued to payday lenders after the
year in which the ordinance'was enacted. There is a significant reduction in new
payday licenses issued during this period in all municipalities shown on the
chart. The second observation is the number of payday lenders still operating in
the municipality. While the number of new licenses has declined significantly in
all municipalities, the industry has not disappeared, particularly in those cities
with restrictive zoning ordinances. Thus, while these ordinances arguably have
had some success in halting the further concentration of payday lenders in
California cities, they have not succeeded in preventing access by consumers to
these businesses. New payday businesses continue to open, even in cities with
restrictive zoning ordinances, and existing businesses continue to operate.
Nevertheless, one objection to drawing any conclusion about the effect of
restrictive zoning ordinances on payday lenders is the possibility that other
factors or forces could explain the observed decrease in payday lenders. One
obvious force potentially affecting the number of new payday lenders entering a
local market is the recent recession: the 2008-2009 economic downturn and its
aftermath. For instance, it might be that fewer payday lenders sought to enter
local markets because of the erosion of their customer base as job layoffs and
unemployment rates increased. Most of the California distance ordinances were
passed during this recession, in the period between 2009 and 2012, but it is
impossible to tell from Table 1 what effect the recession has had on payday-
lending markets.
In order to isolate the potential effect of the recession on the payday-
lending industry, it is necessary to compare the pre- and post-recession
licensing patterns of payday lenders in cities that have not enacted payday
zoning restrictions and are not located in close proximity to those that have such
ordinances in effect. The following table (Table 2) contains the relevant data on
other cities - in California with a significant number of payday lenders.
Specifically, for these cities, Table 2 presents the number of lenders licensed as
of 2004, the year after the California state law regulating the terms of payday
loans took effect, the ensuing years leading up to the recession, and then the
immediate years following the onset of the recession.
As Table 2 depicts, the pattern of payday licensing in these cities reveals a
substantial decline in new payday licenses issued during the height of the
recession, between 2009 and the end of 2012. A similar decline during the same
period is reflected in Table 1 in cities with restrictive zoning ordinances and in
closely proximate surrounding cities. The pattern reflected in both charts thus
strongly suggests that the impact of the recent recession likely plays a
significant role in the decline in payday lenders in California, regardless of
whether the city has a restrictive zoning ordinance in effect during this period.
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Table 2: Licenses to "Deferred Deposit" Firms in Cities Without Distance
Ordinances nor in Close Proximity to Cities with Distance Ordinances
New Licenses New Licenses New Licenses Current Active
city Before 2004 2005-2008 2009-2012 Licenses as of
12/31/12
Anaheim 28 23 13 26
Bakersfield 41 25 3 42
Fresno 64 51 4 66
Los Angeles 147 111 37 149
Modesto 29 5 2 27
Pasadena 12 7 3 11
Pomona 17 18 5 16
Riverside 26 26 7 28
San Bemadino 25 7 3 21
San Diego 71 46 18 67
San Jose 45 34 7 39
Stockton 26 19 3 27
Santa Ana 24 23 13 32
Van Nuys 21 25 6 14
Total 576 420 124 565
Source: California Department of Corporations
This is not to say that zoning restrictions have not had any effect on the
reduction and de-concentration of payday lenders in a particular locality. It
might be that such ordinances provided an additional deterrent, beyond the
recession, for new payday lenders to enter some local markets. This effect is
difficult to measure by publicly available data, however. What the data does
establish is that restrictive zoning ordinances have not been able to, even during
a recession, completely separate payday lenders from consumers. Indeed, the
recession may have had the most powerful effect in reducing the numbers of
payday lenders in all municipalities across California. Nevertheless, it is also
clear that payday lenders continue to enter local markets and operate within
those markets.
Zoning restrictions designed to limit the number of payday lenders within a
locality, prevent them from locating near each other, or both, still might have
some role to play in reducing the concentration, or agglomeration, of payday
lenders in some local markets. This raises the question whether zoning laws
aimed at preventing or disrupting the agglomeration of payday lenders in a city
or urban region serve to protect or help consumers in some way. Another way
of asking this is whether there are any benefits to consumer welfare in allowing
payday lenders to agglomerate in a particular municipality. The next Part
suggests that the answer is likely yes and, further, that zoning restrictions which
prevent or break up such agglomerations can harm the very consumers they are
meant to protect. That is, in the absence of the financial regulatory reform
payday-lending critics desire, allowing some degree of payday-lender
agglomeration has the potential upside of reducing lending rates and changing
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some of the other loan features that consumer advocates find most
troublesome. 97
IV. ZONING, AGGLOMERATION, AND CONSUMER WELFARE
Classic Euclidean zoning, by separating commercial uses from residential
uses, and concentrating those firms in designated zones, can facilitate the
development of positive spillovers, which firms can capture by being located
close to one another. These spillovers are what economists call "positive
agglomeration externalities." 98 Legal scholars recently have begun to wrestle
with the relationship between zoning and agglomeration economies, but have
done so only through the prism of supply-side externalities-i.e., the positive
spillovers that result from being located close to workers and other firms in the
industry.99 As this Part argues, zoning controls can also shape the degree to
which demand-side externalities-i.e., the positive benefits that accrue from
being located close to consumers-operate to increase the welfare of
consumers.
A. Retail Agglomerations and Consumer Behavior
Since the 1980s, economists have explored the idea that positive
externalities from industry clusters are the cause of increased productivity of
firms and individuals.100 Clustered firms benefit both from economies of scale
and from economies of specialization, which can help stimulate growth and
innovation in an industry.' 0 ' Evidence of industry clusters are found in the
automobile industry in Detroit, the theater and garment industries in New York
97 This Article brackets the question of what kind of agglomeration patterns would be
desirable, given the complexity of agglomeration economics. Competitive price pressure, for
example, may depend on the existence of a variety of business formats and other factors
sensitive to a particular industry. See infra Parts IV.B, V.A.
98 Positive externalities occur when the "net benefits to being in a location together
with other firms increase with the number of firms in the location." W. Brian Arthur,
"Silicon Valley" Locational Clusters: When Do Increasing Returns Imply Monopoly?, 19
MATHEMATICAL Soc. Sci. 235, 237 (1990).
99 See infra notes 103, 107.
100 Economists have focused on externalities first suggested by Alfred Marshall in
PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 55 (abr. ed. 2006).
101 Paul Krugman famously stressed the role of reduced transportation costs in getting
materials from suppliers and to customers. See Paul Krugman, Increasing Returns and
Economic Geography, 99 J. POL. EcoN. 483, 485 (1991). It should be noted, however, that
there is some dispute over the geographic distance over which agglomeration benefits appear
to attenuate. See, e.g., Brian T. McCann & Timothy B. Folta, Location Matters: Where We
Have Been and Where We Might Go in Agglomeration Research, 34 J. MANAGEMENT 532,
541 (2008) [hereinafter McCann & Folta, Location Matters] (summarizing the disagreement
among researchers about what distance agglomeration measures should be aggregated).
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City, and the technology industry in Silicon Valley, among others.102 However,
the same agglomeration economies can be found in local service markets and
among smaller-scale retail businesses, such as automobile dealers, shoe stores,
hotels, and mall food courts. 10
3
Much of the agglomeration economics literature has focused on supply-side
explanations for why some firms cluster together. These include economies of
scale as a result of being in close proximity to suppliers and workers and the
positive spillovers . from the ease of sharing knowledge and technological
expertise with other firms.104 Demand-side externalities, however, offer much
more explanatory power for retail industries and local sellers of consumer goods
and services than for producers of national scale goods, which benefit more
from supply-related externalities. 05 Demand-side externalities are common to
those businesses or industries in which product or service heterogeneity exists
and consumers wish to inspect their products and services prior to purchase.106
On the demand side, economists have long postulated that consumer search
behavior can lead retail firms to cluster.107 Consumer search costs are
influenced by retail firm location, in part, because buyers have imperfect
information and agglomeration facilitates the ability to discover and inspect the
goods and services of multiple firms.' 08 Positive spillovers can occur when
102 See, e.g., PAUL KRUGMAN, GEOGRAPHY AND TRADE 35 (1991) (most manufacturing
sectors and many producer-service industries have a large presence in a few geographical
locations and very little going on elsewhere); see also RICHARD FLORIDA, THE RISE OF THE
CREATIVE CLASS, REVISITED 189 (2012) (citing the maquiladora electronic and auto parts
districts in Mexico, the clusters of disk-drive manufacturers in Singapore, the flat-panel
display industry in Japan, clusters of insurance companies in Hartford, casinos in Las Vegas,
furniture manufacturing in High Point, North Carolina, and advanced imaging laboratories in
Rochester, New York). See generally Glenn Ellison & Edward L. Glaeser, Geographic
Concentration in U.S. Manufacturing Industries: A Dartboard Approach, 105 J. POL. ECON.
889 (1997) (discussing Silicon Valley-style localizations of individual manufacturing
industries in the United States).
10 3 See, e.g., Stephen Brown, Retail Location Theory: The Legacy of Harold Hotelling,
65 J. RETAILING 450, 451 (1989).
104 Specifically, knowledge- and technology-intensive industries that require high
innovation and have a common technology core are more likely to benefit from supply-side
externalities, such as specialized labor, specialized inputs, and knowledge spillovers. Brian
T. McCann & Timothy B. Folta, Demand- and Supply-Side Agglomerations: Distinguishing
Between Fundamentally Diferent Manifestations of Geographic Concentration, 46 J.
MGMT. STUD. 361, 368-70 (2009) [hereinafter McCann & Folta, Demand- and Supply-Side].
105 See generally id. (explaining that supply-side and demand-side explanations for
agglomeration are quite distinct and discussing different kinds of agglomerations, although
in some rare industries, supply- and demand-side externalities overlap).
106Id. at 368 (noting the applicability and relevance of demand-side externalities in shoe
stores, automobile dealers, and hotels).
107 Harold Hotelling, Stability in Competition, 39 ECON. J. 41, 53-54 (1929) (positing
that firms cluster to attract consumers that want to minimize travel costs when making a
purchase).
108 Charles Stuart, Search and the Spatial Organization of Trading, in STUDIES IN THE
EcoNoMICS OF SEARCH 17, 17 (S.A. Lippman & J.J. McCall eds., 1979); Konrad Stahl,
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heterogeneous retailers selling comparable goods or services co-locate
together,109 or when firms in the same industry co-locate and provide a wider
variety of firms from which to choose, thereby increasing the chances that
consumers will purchase from the agglomeration.1 10 As more of these firms join
the agglomeration, and consumer search costs are reduced, more consumers are
drawn to the agglomeration and the net benefits of agglomeration increase for
the firms in that location.'
The demand-side benefits extend not only to the agglomerating firms, but
also to consumers in ways that have implications for consumer welfare. As the
next Part explains, one effect of retail agglomerations is to incentivize firms to
compete on price and product variety. When rival firms compete with each
other, this is undoubtedly good for consumers. Indeed, there is evidence that
consumers can benefit from lower pricing on similar goods and services from
increased price competition by closely proximate rival firms.
B. Firm Proximity and Retail Competition
Conventional economic wisdom suggests that zoning restrictions reduce the
number of firms in a location and, with fewer firms, reduce competition among
firms.112 However, the relationship between zoning restrictions and retail
competition is more ambiguous and complex than economists had initially
assumed.113 Whether zoning decreases retail competition by increasing the
Diferentiated Products, Consumer Search, and Locational Oligopoly, 31 J. INDus. EcoN.
97, 97 (1982) (firms can reduce search costs by locating closer to consumers and, in turn, the
reduction of consumer search costs may lead to a spatial concentration of demand that firms
in the same industry, despite being competitors, find it profitable to locate close to one
another); see also B. Curtis Eaton & Richard G.. Lipsey, Comparison Shopping and the
Clustering ofHomogenous Firms, 19 J. REGIONAL SCI. 421, 422 (1979).
109 Boudhayan Sen et al., Demand Externalities from Co-Location 20-21 (Yale Univ.
Cowles Found., Discussion Paper No. 1850, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstractid=2002302 (finding positive spillovers in increased spending on
groceries from the co-location of grocery stores and gas stations).
11 0 McCann & Folta, Demand- and Supply-Side, supra note 104, at 371 (all that is
required for a reduction in search costs is a grouping of similar firms from which customers
can choose).
11 1Id. at 368. Of course, there are diseconomies of scale on the demand side if
agglomerations significantly intensify local competitive pressures and innovation or product
diversification suffers. Id. at 380-81; see also Jeffrey H. Fischer & Joseph E. Harrington, Jr.,
Product Variety and Firm Agglomeration, 27 RAND J. EcoN. 281, 282-85 (1996) (finding
that greater consumer demand motivates firms to cluster, but only when there is substantial
product heterogeneity is this effect sufficiently strong to counterbalance the increased
competition that accompanies agglomeration).
112David B. Ridley et al., Retail Zoning and Competition 3 (2011), available at
https://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/-dbrl/research/zoning-competition.pdf (Duke Univ., Working
Paper).
1l3 For example, the presence of competitor firms in a commercial zone may operate
either to attract other retail firms or to make competitors less likely to enter the market. For
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market power (or monopolies) of certain firms or intensifies competition by
forcing competitors to locate closer together depends on factors particular to
each industry and perhaps even to each firm. A firm's expected payoffs from
locating close to competitors is very much shaped by the presence of
agglomeration economies, the market characteristics of the particular industry,
distance to consumers, and the ability to differentiate itself by product or service
format.114
One way that retail firms respond to zoning restrictions that force firms to
locate closer together than they otherwise would is through differentiation
strategies. There is evidence that retail firms tend to increase format (or
product) variety, without reducing firm entry, as a reaction to land-use controls
that decrease their proximity to one another. 115 We might see, for example, food
retailers continue to enter into a crowded, competitive market, but vary their
format by size and product variety. As such, a commercial zone might contain a
mix of supermarkets, supercenters, convenience stores, and mass-
merchandising stores that sell food and other items. 116 As one recent study
explains, "Consumers may wish to shop at stores of different formats: they may
shop mostly at a supercenter and then shop at a close-by natural food store or
limited assortment store for select products."I17
The close proximity of rival retailers will likely generate demand-side
agglomeration benefits for firms willing to vary their formats and for consumers
comparing products and services. In particular, competing retailers with
heterogeneous formats gain additional customer traffic and consumers benefit
from a more robust variety of products and shopping formats.118 These
some firms, even though the intensity of retail competition decreases with distance between
firms, consumer demand can incentivize firms to locate within closer proximity to one
another. See, e.g., A. Yegim Orhun, Spatial Diferentiation in the Supermarket Industry: The
Role of Common Information, 11 QUANTITATIVE MARKETING & EcON. 3, 34 (2013)
(explaining that empirical results demonstrate that these two counteracting incentives are
traded off differently by different types of supermarkets).
114 Tatyana Kuzmenko, An Empirical Model of Firm Entry with Zoning 9-10 (Oct. 26,
2007), available at http://econ.duke.eduluploads/media-items/firmentryandzoning.origin
al.pdf (Duke Univ., Working Paper).
115 Sumon Datta & K. Sudhir, Does Reducing Spatial Diferentiation Increase Product
Diferentiation? Effects of Zoning on Retail Entry and Format Variety, 11 QUANTITATIVE
MARKETING & EcoN. 83, 101 (2013) [hereinafter Datta & Sudhir, Reducing] (explicating
that when zoning restrictions proliferate in a market, entering grocery retailers are more
likely to exhibit greater diversity in their store formats as a means to mitigate the reduced
scope for spatial differentiation).
116Id. at 86.
1l7Id. at 108.
118See Sumon Datta & K. Sudhir, The Agglomeration-Differentiation Tradeoff in
Spatial Location Choice 35 (2011) (unpublished manuscript) [hereinafter Datta & Sudhir,
Agglomeration] (finding that grocery consumers not only value economies of scope from the
presence of other, non-grocery businesses at a location, but they also value the
agglomeration of multiple grocery stores at the location; and finding that consumers are
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agglomeration benefits are apt to be even greater in centralized (versus outskirt)
commercial zones, given the ease with which consumers can access different
retail formats and the tendency for smaller retailers to locate there.1 19
Moreover, where zoning restrictions facilitate competitive firm
agglomeration, there is a fairly direct relationship between zoning controls and
price competition. As David Ridley et al. demonstrate, the smaller and more
concentrated the area in which retail firms agglomerate, the stronger is the
correlation with lower prices for consumers. 120 That is, the number of firms is
not as important a variable in price competition as the space available for firms
to locate in a particular area. The larger the zoned area, and the more distance
between firms, the higher prices tend to be, even between rivals.121 As such,
where firms are forced to locate closer to one another, in a centralized
commercial "strip" for example, there is a clear incentive to compete on
price. 122 Thus, an unintended consequence of zoning, which concentrates
commercial retailers, might be to increase price competition under certain
circumstances. This competition obviously benefits consumers if it results in
lower prices for similar products.123
C. Zoning For and Against Agglomeration
As we have seen, traditional Euclidean zoning controls can facilitate both
supply- and demand-side positive spillovers by not only concentrating firms
together in a commercial zone, but also by decreasing the distance between
firms.124 The converse is likely also the case, however. Zoning regulations that
restrict the entry of rival retailers or impose separation requirements that push
more likely to visit locations with multiple grocery stores when the cluster of stores consists
of different formats).
119 Datta & Sudhir, Reducing, supra note 115, at 86 (explaining that centralized zoning
leads to greater retail format variety with a number of smaller retail formats, relative to
outskirt zoning which leads to more homogenous larger zoning format).
120 See Ridley et al., supra note 112, at 20.
121 Id. at 20-21 (explaining that markets with more space for firms tend to have more
firms and higher prices).
1221d. at 21-22 (noting the risk that lower prices can drive out firms, or induce less
entry, which can result eventually in prices rising somewhat).
123 See Jerry Hausman & Ephraim Leibtag, Consumer Benefits from Increased
Competition in Shopping Outlets: Measuring the Effect of Wal-Mart, 22 J. APPLIED
ECONOMETRICS 1157, 1176 (2007) (finding that Wal-Mart's "superstore" entry into a new
geographic market creates a direct price effect by offering a lower-price option to consumers
and an indirect price effect by causing traditional supermarkets to lower their prices because
of the increased competition).
124 See, e.g., Datta & Sudhir, Agglomeration, supra note 118, at 38-39 (finding that
when zoning is more restrictive, some retail grocery stores agglomerate because they
recognize that by co-locating they can gain from agglomeration benefits, which may
outweigh the relatively constrained benefits from spatial differentiation).
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firms farther apart risk a reduction in the positive agglomeration benefits that
might accrue to firms and consumers.
Legal scholars have recently begun to recognize the ways in which zoning
mechanisms can frustrate, as well as facilitate, supply- and demand-side
positive agglomeration externalities for firms. As Daniel Rodriguez and David
Schleicher have argued, zoning limitations on commercial development can be
thought of as a supply-side restriction, making it difficult for firms to capture
the spillovers from close proximity. Such restrictions impede the "location
market" and can raise transport costs, reduce the advantages market size yields,
and interrupt the flow of information spillovers.125 The same can be said on the
demand side of the agglomeration benefits ledger. Gideon Parchomovsky and
Peter Siegelman, for example, urge cities to use their zoning and other land-use
planning tools to not only establish commercial districts, but also to ensure the
right mix of various sizes and layouts within the commercial districts to
maximize the positive externalities from commercial agglomerations.126 This
kind of careful agglomerative planning, they argue, would help attract
consumers to downtown areas and create a higher volume and more attractive
mix of stores that would allow for the internalization of positive externalities
among retailers. 127
This Article takes these arguments one step further and argues that zoning
limitations on retail firm proximity can frustrate the internalization of positive
externalities by consumers, not just firms. Specifically, zoning which restricts
firm location risks depriving consumers of the agglomeration benefits that
competition between proximate firms can provide. This is not to say that all
location restrictions imposed on retail firms threaten consumer welfare. Exactly
where the balance is struck between the right degree of concentration and
separation will depend on a number of factors, including the topography of a
particular municipality, the proximity of businesses that locate there, and the
characteristics of certain industries. The point here is that zoning controls can be
deployed in ways that have important implications for consumers of retail goods
and services. These implications have relevance, the next Part argues, for the
assessment of whether zoning restrictions on payday lenders further the
consumer protection and welfare goals that animate them.
V. ANTI-AGGLOMERATION ZONING AND CONSUMER WELFARE
The previous Part argued that zoning restrictions can both facilitate and
frustrate the positive benefits of retail agglomerations, particularly for
consumers. Traditional zoning restrictions that force firms to locate closer
together, such as in a commercial zone, can benefit consumers by reducing
125 See Rodriguez & Schleicher, supra note 24, at 638, 653.126 Parchomovsky & Siegelman, supra note 21, at 246-60 (relying on literature on the
economics of shopping malls).
127 Id
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search costs and inducing format and price variety. Given the potentially
positive relationship between zoning, agglomeration economies, and consumer
welfare, this Part examines the benefits and costs of using zoning laws to
prevent or limit payday-lender agglomeration.
A. The Benefits of Payday Agglomeration
Payday lenders are retail service firms able to take advantage of
agglomeration economies by co-locating in commercial zones or "strips." It is
very common to find clusters of AFSPs-payday lenders, check cashers, auto
title lenders, etc.-in these zones in part because of the supply-side and
demand-side scale economies that result from spatial proximity. Payday lenders
and other AFSPs are able to capture the positive spillovers from shared local
labor market pools, shared local media and advertising which attract consumers
to the agglomeration, and the development and access to overhead services-
such as store supervision-which can be spread across multiple stores in the
cluster.128
It logically follows that consumer search costs are lowered and product,
format, and price variety are likely to increase when payday lenders cluster
together. That is, payday-loan customers are better able to compare the variety
and pricing of different financial services if payday lenders are located within a
defined geographical area. This is particularly the case for low- and middle-
income populations, the majority of payday customers, who own fewer
automobiles per capita and are more dependent on public transportation than
their wealthier counterparts. In fact, the very existence of commercial zones,
which forces retailers to concentrate, benefits consumers with fewer
transportation options. Not only are their search costs lowered by such
concentration, but the ability to engage in comparison shopping is facilitated
(and often made possible) by retail agglomeration.
The presence of multiple payday lenders and other AFSPs is often
accompanied by format variety among them. It is not uncommon to find in an
AFSP agglomeration both stand-alone payday lenders as well as multi-service
storefronts, or "financial supermarkets," which offer check cashing, money
orders, bill payment, tax preparations, and wire remittances. The literature on
retail firm agglomeration in the banking industry suggests that such format and
product and service variety results in part from firm efforts to differentiate
themselves from their competitors. Market differentiation benefits financial
services consumers by giving them more choices, resulting in consumer surplus,
as compared to markets in which there is no product or format differentiation
128 See, e.g., AMITABH BHATNAGER, RuRAL MICROFINANCE AND MICROENTERPRISE:
INFORMAL REVOLUTION 48-49 (2008) (Many "'one-stop' shops . .. offer[ ] a real alternative
to those who have traditionally been outside the financial mainstream .... The advantages
of these entities for the customer include locational convenience, few requirements, rapidity
of loan decisions, and multiple services.").
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among banks.129 This consumer benefit exists even in the absence of explicit
price differentiation.
Whether payday-lender agglomeration leads to increased consumer welfare
or price competition is more difficult to say. On the one hand, payday lenders
operate within a financial services marketplace much like traditional retail
banks. If traditional retail bank branch agglomeration increases consumer
welfare or price competition through product or format variety, the same
arguably would be true of AFSPs like payday lenders. One study of payday loan
pricing in Colorado provides some evidence of this. The authors compared
payday-lender finance charges over a six-year period, including on loans
extended before and after the state legislature imposed a price ceiling on payday
loans. 130 The study found that before the price ceiling was imposed, loan prices
were more competitive and generally lower, particularly in local markets with a
large number of payday lenders. After the legislation, however, the competitive
effects disappeared and lending prices gravitated toward the regulatory price
ceiling over time. 131
There is some reason to suspect that demand for payday loans may be price-
inelastic, even in an unregulated market.132 Price inelasticity may be a function
of inelastic consumer demand for payday lending in markets where borrowers
have limited financial service choices.133 In such markets, it may be tempting
129 See, e.g., Mian Dai & Yuan Yuan, Product Differentiation and Efficiencies in the
Retail Banking Industry, 37 J. BANKING & FIN. 4907, 4908 (2013) (finding that the presence
of both single-market and multi-market banks results in a consumer surplus; that consumer
surplus drops by almost thirty percent when only single-market banks or only multi-market
banks are allowed to operate).
130 DeYoung & Phillips, supra note 27, at 2.
13 1Id. at 12 (finding that the percentage of payday loans carrying the maximum legal
finance charge increased "systematically" from 69% in 2000 to 97% in 2006). Moreover,
strategic pricing behavior emerged in which lenders began charging lower prices to first-
time customers and higher prices to repeat borrowers. Lenders in largely minority (African-
American and Hispanic) neighborhoods and near military bases also began charging higher
prices. Id. at 3 n.3 (noting that the data sample ends in December 2006, prior to federal
legislation that limited interest rates on loans to military personnel).
132 See, e.g., Robert Mayer, When and Why Usury Should Be Prohibited, 116 J. Bus.
Ermcs 513, 518 (2012) (relying on data that show that most lenders in a given market
charge essentially the same fees for their loans, and that these fees are almost always the
same for all customers, regardless of their creditworthiness). But see Matt Zwolinski, Are
Usurious? Another New Argument for the Prohibition of High Interest Loans?, I Bus.
ETHIcs J. REv. 22, 25 (2013) (responding to Mayer by arguing that another way to read the
data is that price convergence suggests that payday-lending markets are in fact competitive
and that market competition has pushed prices toward equilibrium). Cf Robert Mayer, The
Cost of Usury, 1 Bus. ETHics J. REv. 44, 47 (2013) (noting that Zwolinski's critique fails to
address his claim that when prices are unregulated the more solvent majority cross-
subsidizes the least creditworthy minority; Zwolinksi ignores completely the distributive
effects of different price regimes in different states in an unregulated market).
133 This may indeed be the case in some neighborhoods, but not in others. As Part H.B.
explained, in many communities, consumers have access to both traditional banking
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for payday lenders to exploit this demand inelasticity, leaving room for little or
no price competition.134 If, in the end analysis, price inelasticity characterizes
most payday-lending markets, then this would lead us to believe that payday
agglomerations may not have the same effect on price as exists in other retail
agglomerations. This result would be consistent with findings that customers of
payday lenders cite convenience (e.g., ease of access, lower credit restrictions,
etc.) over price as the determining factor in where they obtain their loan.135 As
such, it may be that the main cost to consumers of breaking up payday
agglomerations is the reduction in convenience and lower search costs of
consuming a product or service that they have already decided has utility for
them.
However, the relationship between payday-lending markets and regulation
is dynamic enough to resist an easy conclusion on the question of price
competition. As an example, the authors of the Colorado study mentioned above
found that there was still market differentiation and price variation among
payday lenders even in a price-controlled market (where prices seemed to be
gravitating toward a statutory price ceiling). That is, even with a price ceiling,
payday stores affiliated with multiple locations (so-called multi-shop branches)
charged higher prices than single-store "mom-and-pop" payday lenders.136
Much like traditional bank branches in a local market, then, the presence of both
single- and multi-market payday lenders likely adds some degree of price
differentiation, which can benefit consumers. 137 The question for local
products and payday lenders. The fact that some consumers prefer the convenience and ease
of payday loans does not mean that they lack choice. However, it is undoubtedly the case
that some consumers-e.g., those with poor credit, those facing institutional or
discriminatory barriers, etc.-have extremely limited financial service choices and thus may
not benefit from an unregulated payday lending marketplace.
134 See, e.g., DeYoung & Phillips, supra note 27, at 3 (suggesting that payday lenders in
Colorado exploited demand inelasticity in minority and military communities, leading to
higher prices in those communities).
135 Zwolinski, supra note 132, at 25.136 DeYoung & Phillips, supra note 27, at 3. The authors also found that multi-store
firms were more likely than independent stores to charge lower prices to first-time customers
and higher prices on long-maturity loans that roll over less frequently. Id. at 3-4. On the
other hand, multi-store firms also tended to charge lower prices than single-store lenders
near military bases and in minority neighborhoods. Id. at 4. The authors posit that "with
higher franchise values at stake, these firms may have willingly absorbed small reductions in
lending margins in order to reduce the headline risk associated with consumer advocate
criticism (and the eventual[] possibility of regulatory intervention)." Id.
137 The authors explain why these two types of stores are likely to exhibit different
pricing behaviors:
Because multi-store affiliates are essentially branch locations, they are likely to act like
revenue centers rather than profit centers, following pricing strategies that are dictated
by headquarters rather than by local management. Customers may also be willing to pay
higher prices for loans at these stores, ceteris paribus, due to actual (better store
locations, nicer in-store amenities) or perceived (advertising-driven) quality differences.
On average, about 83 percent of the loans in our data were written at payday stores
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governments thus might be how best to encourage retail service branch and
format variety among lenders as a way of encouraging more robust price and
product competition. That is, if local governments are going to regulate payday
lenders through their zoning power, they might deploy this power to encourage
a mix of smaller, independent firms and larger, multi-shop branches to
agglomerate.138
Evidence of a dynamic relationship between payday-lending markets and
state financial regulation suggests that anti-agglomeration zoning regulations
are likely to be, at best, neutral and, at worst, harmful to consumer welfare. At
best, anti-agglomeration zoning may reduce the number of payday lenders but
not eliminate them altogether, as the California experience suggests.139 If
consumers are apt to use payday lenders over other alternatives for reasons of
access and convenience, then they will continue to do so albeit with fewer
choices. Even in markets with stubborn price inelasticity, the existence of fewer
options is likely to have some negative impacts on consumer choices among
payday lenders and may increase consumer search costs if they have to increase
the time and effort expended on comparison shopping. At worst, anti-
agglomeration zoning threatens to remove the incentive for product, format, and
price competition that firm proximity can induce. Given the high demand for
payday lenders in some economic classes and the lack of attractive alternatives,
it is difficult to see how preventing payday firm agglomeration increases the
welfare of those customers inclined toward utilizing these lenders.
B. The Costs of Payday Agglomeration
As the previous Part argued, the relationship between payday-lender
agglomeration and enhanced consumer welfare is at least theoretically solid,
even if a definitive conclusion about that relationship begs for more empirical
affiliated with multi-store companies; MULTISTORE is a dummy variable that
indicates these loans. The sign of coefficient on this variable is theoretically ambiguous:
while the revenue-maximization and product-differentiation phenomena both predict a
positive sign, the potential for scale economies within these larger organizations may
allow affiliates in multi-store firms to charge lower prices. To the extent that successful
product differentiation creates higher franchise value at these firms, multi-store payday
lenders may be hesitant to pursue pricing strategies that elicit reactions from consumer
groups and the press (e.g., exploiting price inelastic demand associated with racial
status, military status, or the elderly) in order to protect that value.
Id. at 18 (footnote omitted).
138 See, e.g., Parchomovsky & Siegelman, supra note 21, at 248 (arguing that cities
should use their zoning and other land-use planning powers to not only establish commercial
districts where retail firms can agglomerate, but also to ensure the right mix of various sizes
and layouts within the commercial districts to maximize the positive externalities from
commercial agglomerations).
139 Moreover, if the lenders that are driven out tend to be smaller "mom-and-pop" stores,
restrictive zoning ordinances could undermine price competition by unwittingly attracting
larger and more national lenders likely to charge higher prices.
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data. One objection to the focus on the positive agglomeration externalities of
payday-lender concentrations is that such analysis fails to acknowledge the
negative costs associated with such agglomerations. Some account of these
costs is necessary given the basic orientation of land-use controls toward
management of the larger urban environment, or commons. 140
One way to conceptualize the negative costs associated with agglomeration
is congestion. A typical example of this congestion is the increased traffic that
results from an increase in density of firms or people. This increased density
can lead to higher transportation costs and more effort for residents or shoppers
to navigate a particular area.141 In the case of retail firms that sell products or
services that tend to draw a lot of foot or vehicular traffic, the risk of congestion
increases for each additional firm that co-locates close to existing businesses.
Of course congestion in and of itself is not necessarily a bad thing. If the
proliferation of Starbucks (or other coffee shops) brings increased vehicular or
foot traffic to a local area, this kind of congestion is most often viewed as a
positive gain for surrounding businesses, property values, and the attractiveness
of the neighborhood. In other words, many kinds of retail agglomerations result
in congestion, but not all forms of congestion are desirable.
The question is not only whether there will be an increase in congestion-
i.e., the amount of foot (or vehicular) traffic-but whether that increase will
impose adverse impacts on third parties. Such "negative agglomerations," as
David Schleicher terms them, involve factors that have increasing returns to
scale but a negative effect, such as crime. 142 The classic modern example of
such negative agglomerations is New York City's Times Square in the 1970s
and 1980s, with its concentration of adult-oriented businesses, single-room
occupancy hotels, and X-rated movie theaters. These businesses were frowned
upon by local residents and city leaders for attracting dense foot traffic of the
wrong type-addicts, drug dealers, prostitutes, pimps, and the like. This foot
traffic increased violent crime in the area, imposing costs on surrounding
neighborhoods, tourists, and theatergoers and eventually led to the elimination
of these land uses from the area. 143
The concentration of payday lenders arguably carries the risk of congestion
and the negative spillover effects of this congestion. Although much of the
140 See generally Sheila R. Foster, Collective Action and the Urban Commons, 87
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 57 (2011).14 1 See McCann & Folta, Location Matters, supra note 101, at 559.
142 David Schleicher, The City as a Law and Economic Subject, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV.
1507, 1528-29. Heavy vehicular traffic, for instance, at some point creates an increased risk
of accidents to pedestrians and other cars, and a significant increase in the pollution load in
the surrounding community. And heavy foot traffic can bring an increase in loitering and
crime.
143 See generally William J. Stern, The Unexpected Lessons of Times Square's
Comeback, CiTy J. (1999), available at http://city-journal.org/html/9_4_the unexpected.
html (discussing the elimination of the sex industry in the area and overall revitalization of
Times Square during the 1980s).
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impetus motivating restrictive payday zoning ordinances is the protection of
consumers and consumer welfare, local lawmakers invariably argue that the
concentration of payday lenders has a negative impact on economic
revitalization in the commercial areas where they are concentrated-i.e., the
equivalent of a "blight" argument. 144 Specifically, they fear an increased risk of
attracting crime due to the concentration of cash carried by payday store
customers, and they also cite the potential for declining neighborhood property
values. 145 Such potential negative spillovers lend credence to proponents of
anti-agglomeration ordinances aimed at the payday industry even if there is yet
no definitive empirical basis for establishing that these effects will
materialize. 146
One way to evaluate arguments about the negative spillovers that can result
from retail agglomerations, especially in the absence of strong empirical
evidence, is to examine the nexus between the primary and secondary effects of
the land use. When lawmakers express concerns about the negative spillovers
144 See generally Colin Gordon, Blighting the Way: Urban Renewal, Economic
Development, and the Elusive Definition of Blight, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 305 (2004)
(noting the expanded definition of blight over time and the breadth of municipalities' ability
to use eminent domain and other land-use tools to redevelop areas that are deemed capable
of higher or better development).
14 5 See, e.g., IRVING, TEX., ORDINANCE 2009-9070 (2009) (noting the "detrimental effect
on local property values and economic redevelopment"); Alix Bryan & Sandra Jones,
Chesterfield Considers New Zoning for Payday Lenders and Pawnshops, WTVR,
http://wtvr.com/2013/01/04/chesterfield-considers-new-zoning-for-payday-lenders-and-
pawnshops/ (last updated Jan. 4, 2013, 7:59 PM) (stating that the planning commission in
Chesterfield County, Virginia, is considering new zoning rules that would apply to
pawnshops and payday lenders because there is a "legitimate concern" that such businesses
might promote criminal activity).
14 6 The empirical evidence is decidedly mixed on the relationship between crime and the
presence of payday lending, and it is difficult to separate correlation from causation. See
Heather Luea, Does Payday Lending Impact Neighborhood Crime Rates? (2010)
(unpublished manuscript) (finding that census tracts in Nashville, Tennessee, with payday-
lending stores had lower property crime rates than census tracts without these lenders);
Adair Morse, Payday Lenders: Heroes or Villains? 3 (2009) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://ssm.com/abstract-1344397 (finding that, in times of distress, access to
credit reduces 1.22 foreclosures per 1000 homes and prevents 2.67 larcenies per 1000
households). But see Charis E. Kubrin et al., Does Fringe Banking Exacerbate
Neighborhood Crime Rates?: Investigating the Social Ecology of Payday Lending, 10
CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL'Y 437, 456 (2011) (a case study of Seattle, Washington, finding
that even after controlling for various factors generally associated with neighborhood crime
rates, there is a significant, positive relationship between payday lending and crime). See
also Harold E. Cuffe, Financing Crime?: Evidence on the Unintended Effects of Payday
Lending 15 (July 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.melbournein
stitute.com/downloads/conferences/LEW2013/LEW2013_papers/CuffeHaroldLEW2013.p
df (citing monthly observations of police agencies in several states finding that access to
payday lending contributes substantially to the "financially motivated crimes" of larceny,
fraud, and forgery, with roughly five additional arrests per 100,000 individuals monthly
following the introduction of access to payday lending).
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from a particular land use, often those reasons are difficult to separate from
concerns about the underlying, primary use of the land. That is, there can be a
thin line between the primary and secondary effects of a particular land use.
Such is the case when lawmakers want to limit the concentration or location of
certain controversial retail industries-e.g., adult entertainment shops, medical
marijuana dispensaries, liquor stores, etc.-by citing the potential for increased
traffic, noise, loitering, and other negative impacts these businesses are
expected to bring.147 A concentration of liquor stores, medical marijuana
dispensaries, pawn shops, and the like is disfavored precisely because the
product or service that they sell is believed to attract (or generate) the type of
clientele or traffic that either will be undesirable to surrounding neighbors and
businesses, or might create nuisances and increase criminal activity in the
area. 148
While in some sense the risks attendant to the attraction of a particular type
of clientele or traffic are "secondary" to the business of selling the product or
service, these spillover effects nevertheless flow directly from the sale of the
product or service itself. In such cases, land use restrictions are as much
directed at the underlying enterprise as they are at the range of potential impacts
that flow directly from that enterprise, and this reality is underscored by the
close nexus between the primary use of the land and the potential secondary
effects on the surrounding neighborhood. However, the fact that local
governments cannot completely or explicitly ban these primary land uses forces
proponents of restrictive zoning laws to craft their arguments in line with the
jurisprudence upholding such restrictions based on their "secondary effects." 49
14 7 See, e.g., RIVERSIDE, CAL., ORDINANCE No. 449.225 (2006) (prohibiting location of
medical marijuana dispensaries in residential areas or in close proximity to schools,
churches, day care centers, and other sensitive uses and citing as the justification the
increased loitering, traffic congestion, parking problems, noise, and other harmful secondary
effects of such businesses); City of Riverside v. Inland Empire Patients Health & Wellness
Ctr., 300 P.3d 494, 512-13 (Cal. 2013) (upholding Riverside ordinance, finding no state
preemption even though state law provides for legal use of marijuana for medical purposes).
14 8 See Salkin, supra note 11, at 526. For an argument that the routine activities at an
adult business site attract predators, generating a "hot spot of predatory crime," see
Lawrence W. Sherman et al., Hot Spots of Predatory Crime: Routine Activities and the
Criminology of Place, 27 CRIMINOLOGY 27, 39 (1989); see also Patricia L. Brantingham &
Paul J. Brantingham, Nodes, Paths and Edges: Considerations on the Complexity of Crime
and the Physical Environment, 13 J. ENVTL. PSYCHOL. 3, 8 (1993).
149 This is particularly the case where the underlying land use's primary purpose has an
expressive character protected by the First Amendment. See generally Young v. Am. Mini
Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (upholding an "anti-skid row ordinance" that prohibited adult
businesses from locating within 1000 feet of any two existing adult businesses or within 500
feet of any residential area on the grounds that it is the secondary effects of crime and
neighborhood deterioration which these zoning ordinances attempt to avoid, not the
dissemination of "offensive speech"); Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41
(1986) (upholding similar ordinance based on the secondary effects of adult theaters on the
surrounding community).
2014] 99
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
Yet, because of the close nexus between the primary use and secondary effects
of some land uses, limiting the latter is akin to directly restricting the former.
The potential secondary effects of payday-lender concentration have a fairly
attenuated nexus with the primary enterprise of the land use and its effects on
consumer welfare. Unlike the aforementioned controversial land uses, it is not
the case that the underlying enterprise of providing short-term loans to working
adults attracts the kind of retail customer undesirable to other businesses or
neighbors or is likely to create street nuisances. To the extent that cash-carrying
customers are vulnerable prey for street thieves, the same could be said for
traditional bank branches, which are typically not the target of restrictive zoning
laws. This is not to say that there are no secondary effects from the
concentration of payday lending or that they should be ignored. Rather, given
the weak nexus between the primary use and secondary effects of payday
lenders, the secondary effects justification should be more carefully
scrutinized-both normatively and empirically 50-to ensure that rational land-
use planning is motivating the zoning restrictions.
It might be argued that, even if anti-agglomeration zoning deprives
consumers of the benefits of payday agglomerations, the potential reduction of
any negative externalities associated with the agglomeration may justify these
losses. Such a balancing act, however, sidesteps the larger context in which
these ordinances have arisen. That is, to the extent that most of the recent
ordinances aimed at limiting or breaking up payday-lender agglomerations are
concerned with consumer protection and welfare, reducing negative spillovers
to the neighborhood "commons" does not directly address the question of
whether payday land-use restrictions enhance consumer welfare or consumer
protection. If consumer welfare is at the heart of restrictions on payday lenders,
then lawmakers should at least consider both the benefits and costs of payday-
lender concentration on consumers.
150 Some courts have already begun to scrutinize restrictions on land uses such as adult
entertainment businesses which, as argued, enjoy a closer nexus between primary and
secondary effects. See, e.g., Abilene Retail #30, Inc. v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 492 F.3d 1164,
1175 (10th Cir. 2007) (ruling that a local government in a rural area could not have
reasonably relied on studies of secondary effects that did not examine businesses in an
entirely rural area); Encore Videos, Inc. v. City of San Antonio, 330 F.3d 288, 294-95 (5th
Cir. 2003) (declaring adult business ordinance unconstitutional because none of the
secondary effects studies cited in the legislative record had studied "take-home" adult media
stores where no adult entertainment is presented or viewed on the premises). But see
Richland Bookmart, Inc. v. Knox Cnty., 555 F.3d 512, 526 (6th Cir. 2009) (holding that a
local government may rely on a study of secondary effects that did not address the particular
category of adult business challenging the ordinance); Doctor John's v. Wahlen, 542 F.3d
787, 793 (10th Cir. 2008) (rejecting claim that the "on-site/off-site" distinction is relevant in
initially judging whether a local government reasonably relied on the studies in enacting its
regulations).
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VI. CONCLUSION
This Article argues that payday-lender zoning restrictions arose in response
to a spatial and regulatory void that exists in the financial services marketplace.
For many low- and moderate-income users, "alternative" financial service
providers can provide a raft to keep them financially afloat. It is also the case
that, as consumer advocacy groups have argued, the use and abuse of payday
lending products can place economically vulnerable consumers at greater risk.
There is no shortage of commentary urging policymakers to tighten rules on
payday lending interest rates and practices in order to better protect the
consumers who depend on these loans for financial solvency. Restrictive zoning
ordinances aimed at the payday industry are a direct response to the failure of
federal and state regulators to provide stronger protections to payday-loan
consumers. In a sense, then, these ordinances have become a species of
consumer protection regulation.
Given the consumer protection provenance of restrictive payday zoning
laws, it is fair to ask about the relationship between anti-agglomerative
character of these laws and consumer welfare. This Article casts considerable
doubt on whether these laws protect consumers in any meaningful way by
reducing the number of, but not eliminating completely, payday lenders in some
municipalities. More importantly, the Article contends that breaking up payday-
lender agglomerations can harm consumer welfare by decreasing market
competition among rival lenders. Such competition can provide consumers-
particularly vulnerable consumers with limited access and options to more
traditional financial service providers-more product and pricing options than
they might have in the absence of this competition. Where this turns out to be
(empirically) true, these zoning restrictions may leave payday lending
consumers economically worse off than they were in an unfettered payday-
location market. This Article suggests that lawmakers should more carefully
weigh the costs and benefits of payday-lender agglomeration and consider
specifically whether and how anti-agglomeration zoning harms or enhances
consumer welfare.
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